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Preface 
 
The main objective of the JRC PESETA II project (Projection of Economic impacts of 
climate change in Sectors of the European Union based on bottom-up Analysis) has been 
to analyse in an integrated way the possible impacts of climate change in Europe. The 
project has involved the coordination of twelve different teams within the Joint Research 
Centre (JRC) of the European Commission (both from Institute for Prospective 
Technological Studies –IPTS– and Institute for Environment and Sustainability –IES–), 
with more than forty scientists involved from a wide range of disciplines, from river flood 
modelling to economics. 
The JRC PESETA II project responds to a need to provide quantitative modelling support 
to the European Commission services regarding the impacts of climate change in Europe. 
The preliminary project results provided background information on climate adaptation 
and impacts to the 2013 EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change.  
High resolution biophysical impact assessment models have run high time-space 
resolution climate data (from DG Research projects) to derive a broad set of climate 
impacts covering, in particular, agriculture, energy, river floods, droughts, forest fires, 
transport infrastructure, coasts, tourism, habitat suitability of forest tree species and 
human health. Most of the biophysical impacts have been integrated into a general 
equilibrium economic model in order to assess the implications of climate change in 
terms of household welfare and economic activity (GDP). 
Further research is needed in complex and relevant areas such as human migration, 
effects on ecosystems services, and the possible consequences of abrupt climate change. 
How adaptation measures can reduce climate impacts should be better understood and 
assessed. 
This publication documents the project methodology and analyses the main biophysical 
and economic results. Further information regarding each sectoral impact assessment can 
be found in the respective technical reports (please visit http://peseta.jrc.ec.europa.eu/). 
 
John Bensted-Smith       Maria Betti 
IPTS Director        IES Director 
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Summary for policymakers 
Policy context 
The EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change, adopted by the European 
Commission in April 2013, aims at contributing to a more climate resilient Europe 
by enhancing preparedness and capacity to respond to the impacts of climate 
change at different geographical scales, as well as developing a coherent approach 
and improved coordination. 
Adaptation to climate change implies addressing the consequences of climate 
change, taking appropriate actions to prevent or minimise damages, and taking 
advantage of opportunities that may arise. However, in order to understand the 
potential benefits of adaptation it is necessary to estimate the impacts of climate 
change without it. The JRC PESETA II project (Projection of Economic impacts of 
climate change in Sectors of the European Union based on bottom-up Analysis) has 
contributed to the EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change by providing 
background information on how climate change could affect a broad set of impact 
areas across the EU, ranging from agriculture to human health and habitat suitability 
of tree species.  
Purpose of the JRC PESETA II project 
The fundamental purpose of the JRC PESETA II project is to gain insights into the 
sectoral and regional patterns of climate change impacts in Europe that may occur 
by the end of this century. The assessment concerns both the biophysical and 
economic impacts of climate change. 
Scope of the project 
Regarding the time horizon, the project covers the climate impacts over the period 
2071-2100 (also referred to as 2080s), compared to 1961-1990. The study 
considers climate impacts in five large EU regions: Northern Europe (Sweden, 
Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Denmark), UK & Ireland (UK and Ireland), 
Central Europe North (Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, and Poland), Central Europe 
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South (France, Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Romania), 
and Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Bulgaria).  
The study analyses a total of ten biophysical impact categories (agriculture, energy, 
river floods, droughts, forest fires, transport infrastructure, coasts, tourism, habitat 
suitability of forest tree species and human health) and considers a broad set of 
climate model simulations (a maximum of fifteen for some impact sectors). Eight of 
those impacts (agriculture, energy, river floods, forest fires, transport infrastructure, 
coasts, tourism and human health) are integrated into an economic model to assess 
the impact on the overall economy and welfare at regional and EU level. 
However, even if the coverage of impacts is relatively broad, it should be stressed 
that the study underestimates the climate damages in Europe because of a number 
of reasons. Firstly, the coverage of the effects due to climate extremes is limited in 
the sectoral models used in the project. Secondly, key impacts without market 
prices, such as losses of ecosystem services or damages to biodiversity, are not 
considered. Thirdly, abrupt climate change or the effects of passing climate tipping 
points are not integrated in the analysis. Finally, the study does not consider how 
Europe would be affected indirectly through the impacts of climate change in the 
rest of the world. Therefore the project cannot fully capture the overall scale of the 
risks due to climate change in Europe in a long-term context. Moreover, for these 
reasons the difference between the Reference and the 2°C simulations should not be 
interpreted as the benefits of mitigation policy. 
Methodology 
The project methodology has two distinctive features. Firstly, it is based on bottom-
up biophysical impact models. Bottom-up models take into account the relationship 
between climate change and biophysical impacts in a structural way, modelling all 
the relevant interactions and mechanisms. Secondly, the assessment is made in a 
consistent way, where all biophysical impact models use the same climate scenarios. 
Most of the biophysical impact models are operated within the JRC. The project has 
benefitted considerably from DG Research and Innovation projects, in particular 
ENSEMBLES and ClimateCost. 
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The economic analysis of climate impacts (in the eight categories mentioned above) 
has been carried out with an economic general equilibrium model. This enables 
comparison of the different impacts based on common metrics (household welfare 
and economic activity or GDP), and also the computation of the indirect effects (in 
addition to the biophysical direct effects). The economic analysis considers a 
hypothetical, counterfactual situation where the climate of the future is assumed to 
occur in the economy of today. 
Adaptation is considered for some of the impacts identified in this report, depending 
on the tools and data available. For instance public adaptation can be analysed 
explicitly in the coastal impact assessment (through measures such as dike 
building), whereas market adaptation (which occurs via changes in market prices) is 
included in the eight sectors evaluated with the economic model. 
Climate simulations 
All sectoral models have considered four core climate simulations. Three of them are 
derived from a medium-high emission scenario without mitigation, namely the SRES 
A1B scenario, which leads to a global temperature increase of 3.5°C, compared to 
the pre-industrial level. The first one, called 'Reference simulation' is considered to 
be a business-as-usual scenario. Two others are driven by the same SRES A1B 
emission scenario but capture the boundaries of a wider range of simulations 
(warmer and drier than the reference, and colder and wetter than the reference). A 
fourth simulation is consistent with the EU 2°C climate goal, the so-called 
ENSEMBLES E1 scenario, which has lower emissions than the SRES A1B scenario. 
For some impact categories a greater number of climate simulations has been 
considered (e.g. a total of twelve for the A1B scenario and three for the 2°C scenario 
for river floods). Some sectoral models have also used an emission scenario higher 
than the SRES A1B, the RCP8.5. That set partly covers the possible range of climate 
simulations due to emission scenarios (A1B, E1 and RCP8.5), climate modelling and 
climate variability (different global and regional climate models).  
Biophysical impact results 
The ten biophysical models cover very different types of climate impacts and 
provide a broad range of results.  
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Agriculture 
Regarding agriculture in the 2080s, it is projected that under the Reference 
simulation crop yields overall will fall by around 10% in the EU, mainly driven by a 
fall of 20% in Southern Europe. In the 2°C simulation agriculture yields are not 
much affected at the EU level.  
The specific analysis of agriculture impacts in the 2020s period (conducted with a 
different agriculture model) shows that technical adaptation can improve the yields 
to a large extent, with a general improvement all over Europe, except for the Iberian 
Peninsula. Under the warm variant of the Reference simulation, crop yields are 
projected to rise in Southern Europe thanks to the additional rainfall. 
Energy 
Energy demand patterns can also be affected by climate change. Under the 
Reference simulation overall EU energy demand could fall by 13%, due mainly to 
reduced heating requirements. All regions would expect to see reductions in energy 
demand except Southern Europe, where the need for additional cooling would lead 
to a demand increase of close to 8%. In the 2°C simulation, EU energy consumption 
would fall to a lesser extent, by 7%. 
River floods 
Climate change is projected to largely change the frequency and magnitude of river 
floods. Flood damages could more than double with the 2080s climate under the 
Reference simulation, reaching around €11 billion/year. The largest increase would 
occur in the UK & Ireland and Central Europe South regions. The number of people 
affected by floods per year could almost double to 290,000. Under the 2°C 
simulation the effects would be smaller, with an annual economic damage of around 
€10 billion, and 240,000 people/year affected by floods. If the 2080s economy is 
simulated (i.e. allowing for economic and population growth, instead of shocking the 
current economy as of today), then the damages would be much greater, reaching 
€98 billion/year and €68 billion/year under the A1B and E1 scenario, respectively. 
This difference is due to the much higher value of assets at risk because of economic 
and demographic developments. 
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The river flood analysis has also studied the costs and benefits of adaptation, with 
the objective to maintain a 1 in 100-year level of flood protection across Europe in 
future time periods. The reduction in damage costs is estimated at €53 billion/year 
by the 2080s, at a cost of €7.9 billion/year.  
It is important to note that flood damage simulations are subject to a high degree of 
uncertainty, partly because of the uncertainty in the extreme precipitation 
projections. 
Droughts 
Streamflow droughts may become more severe and persistent in many parts of 
Europe due to climate change, except for northern and northeastern parts of Europe. 
In particular, southern regions will face strong reductions in low flows. As a 
consequence, EU cropland affected by droughts is projected to increase 7-fold in the 
Reference simulation, reaching 700,000 km2/year, almost twice the area of 
Germany. The largest increase in exposed area would be in Southern Europe 
(reaching nearly 60% of the total EU affected area, compared to 30% today). People 
affected by droughts would also largely increase from today's levels by a factor of 
seven, reaching 153 million/year in the Reference simulation. Again half of the 
overall population affected would be in the Southern Europe region. The multi-
model ensemble projections of more cropland and people affected by drought in the 
south and the opposite signal in the north are statistically highly significant and 
robust amongst the Reference simulation members, while the projected changes are 
more dissonant in a transition zone in between. 
Forest fires 
Burned area due to forest fires could more than double in the Southern European 
region in the Reference simulation, reaching almost 800,000 ha. The increase would 
be smaller (by 50%) under the 2°C simulation. 
Transport infrastructure 
The transport study did only consider a limited range of future impacts and 
adaptation measures for the land transport infrastructures and did not cover other 
transport modes. Damages to transport infrastructure due to extreme precipitation 
induced by climate change could increase by 50% in the Reference simulation to 
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reach around €930 million/year. Under the 2°C simulation the damage would 
amount to €770 million/year. Higher temperatures would also require greater 
spending on asphalt binder, though milder winters would also result in reduced 
maintenance costs. In addition, greater expenditure would be needed to prevent 
bridge scour (damage to bridges from increased river flow) and speed restrictions 
would be needed to prevent buckling of railways. Altogether it is estimated that this 
would require around €590 million of additional annual spending in the 2080s, 
compared to a counterfactual without climate change. In addition, it is estimated 
that 1 metre of sea level rise would place transport assets worth around €18.5 
billion at risk of permanent or temporary inundation. Furthermore, these estimates 
do not account for potential expansion of the transport network between now and 
the 2080s. 
Coasts 
Regarding the effects due to sea level rise, damages associated with sea floods 
(without public adaptation) could more than triple in the Reference simulation, to 
attain €17 billion/year. The highest increase in damages could occur in the Central 
Europe North region (almost a four-fold rise, with a damage of €9 billion/year). The 
damages in the 2°C simulation would reach almost €14 billion/year. 
Tourism 
Concerning the effects on tourism expenditure the results for the Reference and 2°C 
simulations are quite similar, with a drop of €15 billion/year. The Southern Europe 
region would have a €7 billion/year fall in the Reference and €5 billion/year loss in 
the 2°C simulation. 
Habitat suitability 
The potential effects of anthropogenic climate change on the distribution of forest 
tree species are illustrated in a pilot study assessing changes in the suitable habitat 
of the Silver Fir (Abies alba), a common and widely distributed European species. 
There could be a shift towards Northern and higher elevation areas of potential 
future habitat of Abies alba under the Reference simulation. Changes in suitable 
habitat of this species are less evident in the 2°C scenario. Nevertheless, new 
suitable areas are evident in the Scandinavian Peninsula and Northern British 
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Islands and Ireland. In addition to the shift to Northern regions of suitable areas it is 
also remarkable a shirking of suitable habitat in mountain regions such as the 
Pyrenees, Alps and Carpathian. This is consistent with an upslope shift towards 
higher elevation. 
Human health 
Climate change-attributable impacts on human health are assessed in those cases 
where the association is well-defined. Heat-related (including heat wave additional 
stress), direct impacts on mortality and morbidity (respiratory, cardiovascular, 
renal failure) and indirect impacts via food and water-borne diseases (salmonellosis 
and campylobacteriosis) have been considered. Under the Reference simulation EU 
annual mortality could more than double (with 100,000 additional deaths/year), 
with most of the increase occurring in the Central Europe regions and Southern 
Europe. Under the 2°C climate simulation the additional deaths/year would fall to 
less than 80,000. 
Economic impact results 
Most of the previous biophysical impacts (barring droughts and habitat suitability) 
have been integrated into an economic model to assess the effects in terms of 
household welfare losses. The economic effects consider the direct climate effects 
(as measured by the biophysical models) and the indirect effects in the economy (as 
calculated with the general equilibrium economic model). Under the Reference 
simulation the annual total damages would be around €190 billion, almost 2% of EU 
GDP today.  
The geographical distribution of the climate damages is very asymmetric with a 
clear bias towards the southern European regions. Relative to GDP (see next Figure), 
the welfare losses range from 0.2% in Northern Europe to 3% in both the Central 
Europe South and Southern Europe regions, i.e. fifteen times higher than the damage 
in Northern Europe. The highest welfare losses would occur in Southern Europe 
(€74 billion), Central Europe South (€58 billion) and Central Europe North (€45 
billion). The damage in the two regions in the south accounts for 70% of the overall 
EU damages in monetary terms. 
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More than half of the overall annual EU damages are due to the additional 
premature mortality (€130 billion). Damages because of impacts in the coasts (€42 
billion) and the agriculture sector (€18 billion) are also quite significant.  
Moving to a 2°C world would reduce annual climate damages by €60 billion to €120 
billion (1.2% of GDP). There would be a reduction of €34 billion in human health 
damages, €16 billion in agriculture and €8 billion in coastal areas. 
It is also found that climate impacts occurring in one EU region could cross the 
borders and affect the rest of the EU to a significant extent (around an extra 25-30% 
impact compared to the original climate impact). As impacts in one region would 
affect production and welfare elsewhere through trade effects, there seems to be a 
need for coordination at EU level to ensure an effective level of preparedness across 
the whole EU territory. 
Climate tipping points 
An exploratory study was launched within the JRC PESETA II project in order to 
assess through expert opinion the potential impacts of selected events where the 
response of the earth system components (e.g. Greenland ice sheet, West Antarctic 
ice sheet, thermohaline circulation) to climate change may be non-linear. Yet the 
agreement reached by the experts was not sufficient for a further economic 
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assessment of the consequences of climate tipping points in Europe, due to the 
difficulty in characterising their biophysical consequences.  
Future research efforts could concentrate on the impacts from West Antarctic ice 
sheet collapse and Greenland ice sheet meltdown as priority areas with a focus on 
the consequences on the sea level rise.  
Further research 
Additional research is required on a number of important areas. The inclusion of 
climate change variability (e.g. the effects of extreme weather events) into the 
various biophysical impact analyses is not comprehensive. Fundamental climate 
impacts that are difficult to model might play a key role in the overall estimate of 
climate damage. They include climate-related migration, the effects on ecosystems 
services and biodiversity, and the possibility of abrupt climate change or climate 
tipping points, with potentially daunting consequences in Europe's economies and 
citizens. How all those effects could influence economic growth in the long term is 
an area that also deserves priority attention. In addition, future research could take 
a global perspective, as climate impacts in the rest of the world will affect Europe, 
e.g. via global (agriculture) markets or via migration flows. Generally speaking, 
uncertainties in climate change and impact modelling remain very large. The depth 
of uncertainly analysis largely varies across sectors. These uncertainties need to be 
reduced in order to allow for robust statements regarding overall climate costs and 
the importance of costs in one sector relative to another. 
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1 Introduction 
Understanding the possible consequences of climate change in Europe matters for 
designing adaptation policies, intending to minimise negative consequences and 
maximise positive effects. This report presents the methodology and results of the 
climate impact assessment of the JRC PESETA II project (Projection of Economic 
impacts of climate change in Sectors of the European Union based on bottom-up 
Analysis). The project economic results have been published in the Impact 
Assessment accompanying the EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change, 16 
April 2013 (European Commission, 2013a). 
The objective of the JRC PESETA II project has been to make a multi-sectoral 
assessment of the impacts of climate change in Europe. This report focuses on the 
very long term impacts, namely for the 2071-2100 time horizon, referred here to as 
the 2080s. The project methodology is based on bottom-up biophysical impact 
models that consider the relationship between climate change and biophysical 
impacts in a structural way1. All biophysical impact models use input data from the 
same climate scenarios. Indeed, with the proposed disaggregated PESETA 
methodology high time-space resolution climate data feed highly detailed sector-
specific impact models to estimate the biophysical impacts.  
A distinctive feature of the assessment relates to the consistent integration of 
various sectoral impacts within an economic modelling framework, that of multi-
sectoral general equilibrium. The comparison of impacts with different metrics can 
be made within a sound and well-established economic methodological setting. 
The project is largely based on the knowledge and experience derived from the 
previous PESETA project (Ciscar et al., 2011). The JRC PESETA II project goes 
beyond PESETA as it considers more impact categories and more climate 
simulations. While PESETA studied the impacts in five areas (agriculture, coastal 
systems, river floods, tourism and human health), JRC PESETA II extends the 
coverage to ten areas, adding droughts, energy, transport infrastructure, forest fires, 
and habitat suitability of forest tree species. Furthermore, in JRC PESETA II up to 15 
                                                        
1 Ciscar et al. (2012a). 
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climate simulations have been modelled by some of the sectoral teams (while only 4 
climate simulations were studied in PESETA). 
The main motivation of launching this series of impact assessments has been to 
better understand the potential consequences of climate change in Europe in order 
to derive useful insights for climate change adaptation. A methodological effort has 
been made to integrate knowledge from the relevant scientific disciplines including 
physics, engineering, biology and economics. 
Most of the impacts and economy modelling work of JRC PESETA II has been made 
within the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission, with the 
involvement of both the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) and 
the Institute for Environment and Sustainability (IES).  
The report is organized in eight sections, including this introduction. Section 2 
presents the main features of the integrated methodology. Section 3 explains the 
climate simulations used in the project. Section 4 presents the main results in terms 
of biophysical or direct impacts, that is, from the biophysical models themselves, 
before their economic integration. Section 5 discusses the main economic impact 
results. Section 6 deals with the possible non-linear effects of climate change. 
Section 7 notes a series of caveats and, finally, section 8 presents the main 
conclusions of this study.  
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2 Methodology 
This section presents the main elements of the methodological backbone of the 
project. The first subsection explains the integration of the main three components, 
i.e. climate data, biophysical and economic models. The second subsection deals 
with the time horizon of the assessment. The third subsection details the specific 
regions in which the EU member states have been aggregated to present the results. 
The fourth subsection explains the way adaptation has been treated in the project. 
2.1 Overview of modelling integration 
The methodology integrates various disciplines in a series of three steps, following 
the approach of the PESETA study2. In the first step the climate simulations are 
selected, which provide the primary climate data to all biophysical models. The 
properties of the selected climate simulations are documented in section 1. In the 
second stage, the biophysical impact models are run to compute the biophysical or 
direct impacts generated by each specific climate change simulation. Some of the 
models also compute impacts in monetary or economic terms, such as the cases of 
the river floods assessment and of transport infrastructures, which compute the 
expected economic damage on an annual basis. Methodological details and results of 
the biophysical assessments for each respective category (e.g. river floods, forest 
fires) and/or sector (e.g. energy, transport) are provided in section 4. In the third 
step, the direct impacts are consistently valued in macro-economic terms through 
their integration into a multi-sector computable general equilibrium model. The 
results in economic terms are presented in section 5. 
Note that there is a conceptual difference between on the one hand the term direct 
or biophysical impact (which refers to the impacts as computed with the biophysical 
or bottom-up models) and, on the other hand, economic impact (which relate to the 
economic effects once the direct effects are integrated into the general equilibrium 
model).  
                                                        
2 Ciscar et al. (2011); see also Christensen et al. (2012). 
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Figure 1 offers an overview of the methodological approach of the project, with two 
main components or tracks: a modelling track and a scoping track. In the modelling 
track, the project has made an explicit quantitative modelling of impacts at two 
levels. For eight impact categories (agriculture, energy, river floods, forest fires, 
transport, coast, tourism and human health) the biophysical impacts have been 
estimated and later integrated into an economic framework. The rest of the impact 
categories (droughts and habitat suitability) have only been analysed in biophysical 
terms, therefore without integrating the impacts into an economic setup. In the 
scoping track the potential impacts associated with passing climate tipping points 
have been studied in a qualitative way (section 6). 
Figure 1. Overview of the project 
Agriculture
Energy
Coast
Transport
River floods
Economic 
integrationForest fires
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Human Health
Tourism
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Suitability
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Biophysical 
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Biophysical 
modelling
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Note that only one biophysical model has been taken into account in each of the 
impact areas, with the exception of agriculture. Therefore this is not a model inter-
comparison project3. In the agriculture sector, two models have been considered: 
one model deals with the very long-term effects (2071-2100) and another one with 
the short time effects (2020-2030).  
                                                        
3 There has been a large effort of model inter-comparison in the recently finished ISI-MIP project (see 
Schellnhuber et al., 2013). 
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2.2 Time dimension: comparative static framework 
Most of the modelling of the project4 has made an assessment of how future climate 
could affect the economy as of today (comparative static approach). The time 
horizon of the climate assessment is the 2080s (2071-2100 period), and also the 
2020s (2020-2030 period) in the case of agriculture. The river flood analysis has 
computed the effects under that comparative static setup and also in a dynamic 
context, i.e. accounting for the dynamics in the economy and population as defined 
by the underlying socio-economic scenarios. 
Therefore, the project looks at what would be the effects of climate change if the 
climate of a future period would occur today, under the current socioeconomic 
conditions. The estimated economic impacts represent a level shift or one-off change 
in welfare or GDP, and not a change in the growth rates. In other words, in this 
assessment the possible effects on economic growth due to the impacts on savings 
and investment decisions are not considered.  
The advantage of this counterfactual situation perspective is that the modelling 
effort can be focused on the impacts of climate change rather than the wider 
question of how Europe's economy might develop to the period 2070-2100 (2080s). 
The disadvantage is that by definition the interactions between climate change and 
economic and population growth are not considered, since climate change is the 
only shock imposed on the EU economy.  
From that perspective, the comparative static approach could be said to 
underestimate the absolute value of climate impacts because economic growth 
would notably increase the assets exposed to climate change. Indeed, the approach 
may also understate or overstate the resilience of the economy. On the one hand, 
climate-induced technological change (e.g. changes in building standards) may 
increase the economy’s ability to tolerate climate impacts over time. On the other 
hand, developments that do not take account of climate-related risks (e.g. ill-
considered development in areas affected by floods or forest fires) could increase 
the extent to which physical impacts create economic damage. 
                                                        
4 The river flood assessment has considered also the influence of population dynamics and economic 
growth on impacts. 
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As a test of a dynamic assessment, where the impact of future climate is analysed 
allowing the economy and land use to change in time, a land use model has been 
used to study the effects on energy. The dynamic coupling of models has been tested 
in the linkage land-water-energy, proving the feasibility of the approach and the 
potential for further multi-sectoral analysis This exploratory work is documented in 
subsection 4.12.  
2.3 Space dimension: European regions 
The biophysical impact analysis has been made in most of the EU countries, with the 
27 member states at the time the analysis was made. The economic analysis has 
been made for 24 EU countries, because Luxemburg, Malta and Cyprus could not be 
modelled in the economic model due to their small economic size. 
Following Ciscar et al. (2011), the results are presented dividing the EU into the 
following regions, according to their latitude and the relative economic size (Figure 
2)5: 
• Northern Europe: Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Denmark. 
• UK & Ireland: UK and Ireland. 
• Central Europe North: Belgium, Netherlands, Germany and Poland. 
• Central Europe South: France, Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Slovenia and Romania. 
• Southern Europe: Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Bulgaria. 
                                                        
5 Luxemburg, Malta, Cyprus and Croatia are not included in the analysis mainly because they are not single 
regions in the economic GEM-E3 model. 
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Figure 2. Grouping of EU countries  
 
2.4 Adaptation dimension 
All reported impacts assume that there is no public adaptation, unless otherwise 
stated. Therefore, the methodology can be useful to understand where to prioritise 
adaptation policy options. But while promoted by public action is not modelled, 
except in some specific cases, autonomous adaptation is considered in more sectors. 
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Adaptation is usually described as action taken in order to moderate harm and 
exploit beneficial opportunities arising due to climate change (Levina and Tirpak 
(2006). Iglesias et al. (2007) specify several opposing types of adaptation 
(anticipatory and reactive, private and public, autonomous and policy-driven).  
Autonomous adaptation is defined as action “taken naturally” by private actors and 
therefore includes any response by producers and consumers to climate-induced 
changes in market prices. This definition is particularly relevant for the current 
analysis since the response of actors to changing prices is the General Equilibrium 
effect that is central to CGE analysis6. For instance, the changes in energy demand 
for heating and cooling could be interpreted as autonomous adaptation7 and, as a 
consequence, the damage to the energy sector could be understood as the cost of 
adaptation. 
In this context several of the impact categories analysed in this study could 
themselves be considered forms of adaptation. This is shown in Table 1 where we 
distinguish between damages that are ‘pure’ (the immediate effect of climate change, 
without considering any reaction either by the private or public sectors) and those 
where some degree of (costed) adaptation is implied within the definition of the 
damage itself from a private perspective. This analysis does not therefore attempt to 
model the cost of certain damages in the case of absolutely no adaptation (e.g. 
refusal of people to migrate in response to flood danger, or refusal of authorities to 
repair the incremental damages to infrastructure that are attributable to climate 
change). It may be more important to consider this question further in future 
analysis (especially in poorer regions of the world).  
In addition to the approach shown in Table 1 this study considers the effect of 
additional, explicit adaptation measures in the case of sea level rise and agriculture 
(in the 2020s and 2030s). Without modelling specific adaptation options, the flood 
analysis also assessed cost and benefits of adjusting protection levels to potential 
increases in flood hazard. 
                                                        
6 The relationship between adaptation and the economic logic of CGE is discussed further in Aaheim et al. 
(2012). 
7 The increase use of air conditioning in order to avoid the negative consequences of heat on human 
health could be interpreted as a form of autonomous adaptation.  
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Table 1. Classification of damages  
Impact category ‘Pure’ Damage 
Autonomous 
Adaptation 
Agriculture Yield change modelled as productivity shock  
Energy 
Effect of climate change on 
power plant efficiency 
(thermal, wind, hydro) 
Temperature change induces 
demand change 
 
River floods Capital destruction  
Forest fires Capital destruction Cost of restoration 
Tourism  Change in holiday destination, duration and frequency 
Transport 
infrastructure 
Capital destruction 
(extreme precipitation) 
Cost of maintenance and 
repair 
Bridge scour protection, 
asphalt binder change, rail 
buckling risk mitigation, SLR 
Sea level rise Capital destruction Cost of migration 
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3 Climate change simulations 
3.1 Emission scenarios 
In this report the term scenario refers to the combination of socioeconomic drivers 
and GHG emissions projections. The term simulation (or run) refers to a specific 
combination of a Global Circulation Model (GCM) and Regional Climate Model (RCM) 
model forced by a given GHG emission scenario. 
The JRC PESETA II project used high resolution (~ 25 Km) climate simulations 
forced by three emission scenarios, namely A1B, E1 and RCP8.5 (see Figure 3). This 
report focuses on impacts associated with the A1B and E1 scenarios. A1B has been 
considered as the reference emission scenario and E1 scenario as a scenario in 
which GHG emissions mitigation action is implemented. 
Figure 3. Total CO2 emission per year (GtC) from the JRC PESETA II scenarios 
Source: IPCC SRES (A1B), ENSEMBLES project (E1) and IIASA (RCP8.5). 
The IPCC SRES scenarios are based on a set of socio-economic driving forces such as 
economy, population, technology, energy and agriculture, which drive the change in 
global greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions. The A1B scenario depicts a future world 
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of very rapid economic growth, low population growth and rapid introduction of 
new and more efficient technology. Major underlying themes are economic and 
cultural convergence and capacity building, with a substantial reduction in regional 
differences in per capita income. In this world, people pursue personal wealth rather 
than environmental quality (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000). The global temperature 
increase (compared to preindustrial levels) of the A1B scenario is roughly 3.5°C8. 
The A1B simulations were obtained from the FP6 ENSEMBLES project (van der 
Linden and Mitchell, 2009). The core A1B simulations considered in PESETA II 
(simulations common run by all sectoral models, see subsection 3.3) were selected 
amongst the 12 simulations listed in Table 2. The simulations used a combination of 
several global and regional climate models9 (GCMs, and RCMs, respectively). 
In this report the term scenario refers to the combination of socioeconomic drivers 
and emissions created by the IPCC or RCP classification (either A1B or E1 and 
RCP8.5 respectively). The term simulation (or run) refers to a specific combination 
of a GCM and RCM models within a given scenario. 
                                                        
8 According to the technical summary of WG I of the IPCC AR4, the average of A1B global temperature 
increase is 2.8°C (2090-2099 over 1980-1999); adding 0.7°C from preindustrial to the 1980s results in 3.5°C 
temperature increase from pre-industrial to end of the XXI century. 
9 There are three versions of the HadCM3 model with perturbed parameterization impacting the 
simulated climate response with different sensitivities: Q0 (reference, ETHZ-CLM-HadCM3 and METO-
HadRM3-HadCM3), Q3 (low-sensitivity, SMHI-RCA-HadCM3) and Q16 (high-sensitivity, C4I-RCA-HadCM3) 
(see Collins et al., 2006). 
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Table 2. Climate change simulations from the A1B scenario (25 km resolution) 
Acronym RCM GCM 
C4I-RCA-HadCM3 RCA HadCM3 
CNRM-ALADIN-ARPEGE ALADIN ARPEGE 
DMI-HIRHAM5-ARPEGE HIRHAM5 ARPEGE 
DMI-HIRHAM5-BCM HIRHAM5 BCM 
DMI-HIRHAM5_ECHAM5 HIRHAM5 ECHAM5 
ETHZ-CLM-HadCM3Q0 CLM HadCM3Q0 
KNMI-RACMO2-ECHAM5 RACMO2 ECHAM5 
METO-HadRM3Q0-
HadCM3Q0 HadRM3Q0 HadCM3Q0 
MPI-REMO-ECHAM5 REMO ECHAM5 
SMHI-RCA-BCM RCA BCM 
SMHI-RCA-ECHAM5 RCA ECHAM5 
SMHI-RCA-HADCM3Q3 RCA HADCM3Q3 
 
The E1 scenario was specifically developed within the ENSEMBLES project as an 
attempt to match the European Union target of keeping global anthropogenic 
warming below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, following a methodology used 
earlier to develop low stabilization scenarios from B2 baseline (Van Vuuren et al, 
2007).  
Three simulations of E1 scenario (listed in Table 3) were performed by MPI (Max-
Planck-Institute for Meteorology, Germany). While the A1B simulations were 
produced by a combination of different GCMs and RCMs, the E1 simulations were 
obtained by downscaling, with a single RCM, one simulation of the ECHAM5 model, 
using three different sets of initial conditions defined as ‘‘-r1’’, ‘‘-r2’’, and ‘‘-r3’’ (see 
Kendon et al., 2010). Thus the range of considered E1 simulations may capture 
much less uncertainty in future climate than in the case of the A1B simulation. 
 36 
 
Table 3. Climate change simulations from the E1 scenario (50 km resolution) 
Acronym RCM GCM 
MPI-REMO-ECHAM5-r1 REMO ECHAM5 (BC r1) 
MPI-REMO-ECHAM5-r2 REMO ECHAM5 (BC r2) 
MPI-REMO-ECHAM5-r3 REMO ECHAM5 (BC r3) 
 
The Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP's) represent a new set of 
scenarios developed for the IPCC 5th assessment report, with a range of radiative 
forcing values in the year 2100 (+2.6, +4.5, +6.0, and +8.5 W/m2). The RCP8.5 
scenario (with a radiative forcing value of +8.5 W/m2) combines assumptions about 
high population and relatively slow income growth with modest rates of 
technological change and energy intensity improvements, leading in the long term to 
high energy demand and GHG emissions in absence of climate change policies. 
RCP8.5 thus corresponds to the pathway with the highest greenhouse gas emissions, 
without any specific climate mitigation target. The RCP8.5 simulation was 
performed at DMI (Danish Meteorological Institute) as part of the ClimateCost FP7 
project. 
3.2 Bias correction 
By using the outputs of CGMs as boundary and initial conditions, limited-area, high-
resolution regional climate models (RCMs) are usually applied in order to obtain 
fine-resolution information that is essential to assess the impact of climate change, 
especially in regions of complex topography, or with highly heterogeneous land-
cover. This technique is usually referred to as dynamical downscaling 
The main 'added value' in the use of RCMs is in their ability to resolve small-scale 
features especially when the surface is the main forcing in generating atmospheric 
variability. However, as RCMs are not able to improve the simulation skills of large-
scale fields over those simulated by the GCMs, the dynamically downscaled climate 
may still present large errors, when compared to observations. In fact, the errors 
inherited from the driving GCM, add up to those introduced by the RCM by means, 
for instance, of model errors and parameterizations (e.g. Fowler et al., 2007).  
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For instance, several studies show that modelled summer temperatures in Southern 
Europe are usually overestimated (e.g. Christensen et al., 2008), while large biases 
exist for precipitation, particularly in Northern Europe (Kjellström et al., 2010).  
The existence of these biases needs to be taken into account when using the outputs 
of climate models in the assessment of weather driven impacts. The influence of 
such biases on hydrological modelling has been thoroughly investigated by e.g. 
Teutschbein and Seibert (2010), who claimed that unless models’ outputs are 
corrected, their application to impact models may be unrealistic. 
Consequently, all the climate simulations used in the JRC PESETA II study were 
corrected for biases in maximum, average and minimum temperatures and 
precipitation following the procedure discussed by Dosio and Paruolo (2011) and 
Dosio et al. (2012).  
Here, a brief description of the technique is reported. More details can be found in 
the original description of the bias correction by Piani et al (2010). 
Let xt denote the time series of an observed climate variable, where t is time (i.e. 
days), and xmod,t the prediction of a climate model for the same variable. The bias 
correction is based on the calculation of a transfer function G (henceforth referred to 
as TF) which, when applied to model predictions xmod,t delivers the corrected 
prediction xcor,t 
xcor,t = G(xmod,t),  
such that the marginal probability density function (PDF) of xcor,t matches that of the 
observed measurement xt. The TF is estimated parametrically as a function of up to 
4 parameters, using the following functional forms: 
 
xcor,t = a + bxmod,t          (1) 
 
xcor,t = (a + bxmod,t) (1-exp(-(bxmod,t – x0)/τ))     (2) 
 
where, a, b, x0 and τ are parameters. The functional form (1) is used for temperature, 
while (2) is used for precipitation. The parameters of the TF (1)–(2) are estimated 
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by ordinary least squares on sorted values of xt and xmod,t in a given month m, so that 
monthly TFs are produced, which are in turn interpolated into daily values. 
Bias correction parameters are calculated for the period 1961-1990 by employing 
the E-OBS dataset (Haylock et al., 2008). A 30-year period was chosen in order to 
take longer climate variability (e.g. decadal) into account. As pointed out by Piani et 
al. (2010), since the bias is defined as the portion of error that is constant in time, if 
the bias correction is constructed over shorter periods of time (e.g. a single decade) 
the component of the error linked to decadal variability may not be removed. 
A thorough evaluation of the technique is reported in Dosio and Paruolo (2011) and 
Dosio et al. (2012), who show that the bias correction technique performs 
successfully for all variables over large part of the European continent, for all 
seasons. In particular, PDFs of both temperature and precipitation are greatly 
improved by the bias correction, especially at the ends of the distributions, i.e. 
increasing the capability of reproducing extreme events. In addition, the bias 
correction technique is also able to improve statistics that depend strongly on the 
temporal sequence of the original field, such as the number of consecutive dry days 
and the total amount of precipitation in consecutive heavy precipitation episodes, 
which are quantities that may have a large influence on, e.g., hydrological or crop 
impact models. For instance, Rojas et al., (2011) showed that by using the bias 
correction technique, the simulation of extreme hydrological events with LISFLOOD, 
(which are the basis for the flood assessment in PESETA II), were considerably 
improved. 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the geographical distribution of mean summer and 
winter temperature and precipitation climate change signal (i.e. the difference 
between the period 2071-2100 and the control period 1961-1990) as simulated by 
the ensemble of the 12 A1B (bias corrected) simulations. These results are in 
accordance with those from the ENSEMBLES final report (van der Linden and 
Mitchell, 2009) and show a general warming up by more than 4°C in Northern 
Europe in winter and in Southern Europe in summer.  
Daily precipitation change at the end of the century shows a general positive trend 
in winter (with the exception of parts of the Iberian Peninsula, Southern Italy and 
Greece), with the increase over Northern Europe and Scandinavia ranging between 
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20% and 45%. However, over Middle, Southern, and Eastern Europe, the value (and 
in some cases also the sign) of the change depends strongly on the model. In 
summer, Southern Europe will face a reduction in precipitation up to more than 
40%. Over great part of Central and Eastern Europe, however, the value of the 
change is small (less than 15%) and comparable to the value of the inter model 
variability (Dosio et al., 2012). 
Figure 4. Mean seasonal climate change signal (°C ) for bias corrected temperature under the 
A1B scenario 
 
                           
 Source: Dosio et al. (2012) 
 
Figure 5. Mean seasonal climate change signal (%) for bias corrected daily precipitation under 
the A1B scenario 
 
 
                                  
 Source: Dosio et al. (2012) 
Winter Summer
Winter Summer
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3.3 Core and additional climate simulations 
All the models’ simulations driven by the same emission scenario represent an 
equally probable projection of the future evolution of the climate. However, due to 
differences in the models’ formulation and physical parameterization, the climate 
change signal projected by different climate models may present significant 
differences.  
Although the use of the entire ensemble would obviously be preferable, many 
impact models are too expensive to be run by using as an input the entire set of 
climate simulations. 
By selecting a subset of models that represent both the mean climate change signal 
and the most extreme deviations from it, one assumes that the main statistical 
properties of the whole ensemble of simulations are conserved10.  
Therefore, the JRC PESETA II study considered four core climate simulations:  
- Reference Simulation. This simulation represents the main characteristics 
of the entire ensemble of 12 A1B simulations. This simulation can be interpreted as 
business-as-usual scenario, as it does not entail significant mitigation efforts.  
Two additional A1B simulations were selected that show significant deviations from 
the ensemble averaged climate change signal: 
- Reference Variant 1. It shows a climate change signal that is warmer and 
drier than the average; 
- Reference Variant 2. It shows a climate change signal that is colder and 
wetter than the average; 
- The 2°C Simulation. This simulation is driven by the E1 scenario and is used 
to illustrate the future impacts in case of global mitigation efforts. 
The combination of climate models chosen for each core simulation11 is shown in 
Table 4.  
                                                        
10 It must be acknowledged that if even this is a pragmatic approach, it will under-sample potential model 
candidates and as such uncertainty will be underestimated. 
11 The agriculture simulations refer to the 2080s assessment, and the climate data come from the 
ClimateCost project (Christensen et al., 2011). 
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Table 4. Climate models chosen for the JRC PESETA II core simulations 
Climate Models Employed Core simulation All other impacts  Agriculture 2080s 
Reference 
simulation 
A1B KNMI-RACMO2-
ECHAM5 
A1B ECHAM5 
(UKMO) 
Reference Variant 1 A1B METO-HC-HadRM3Q0-HadCM3Q0 A1B ECHAM5 (DMI) 
Reference Variant 2 A1B DMI-HIRHAM5-ECHAM5  
A1B EGMAM2006 
(FUB) 
2°C simulation MPI-REMO-E4  E1 ECHAM5.4 (MPI) 
Table 5 summarises the climate simulations considered for each study. The specific 
climate models of each climate simulation are explained in section 1. 
Table 5. Climate simulations in each impact area of the study12 
Climate simulations 
Impact category Reference 
simulation 
Reference 
variant 1 
Reference 
variant 2 
2°C 
Simulation 
Additional 
simulations 
Agriculture 
(2020-2030)  X X   
Agriculture 
(2080s) X X X X 
 
Energy X X X X All other 
River floods X X X X All other 
Droughts X X X  All other A1B 
Forest fires X X X X  
Transport 
infrastructure X X X X RCP8.5 
Sea level rise X   X  
Tourism X X X X All other 
Habitat suitability 
of forest tree 
species 
X X X X  
Human Health X X X X  
Source: JRC PESETA II project 
                                                        
12 The simulations for agriculture 2080s and sea level rise are derived from climate models that are 
different from the other impact sectors. The agriculture 2080s simulations come from global circulation 
models, and are not bias corrected (see Table 4 for the mapping of climate simulations). For sea level rise, 
the DIVA model does not use the same circulation models, but considers the sea level rise consistent with 
the A1B and E1 scenarios (see Table 4). See Chapter 3.3 for details. 
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The selected simulations show a significant variability in the evolution of the mean 
climate for both temperature and precipitation (Figure 6). The temperature increase 
from the control period13 (1961-1990) until the 2080s varies between 2.4°C and 
3.9°C, with values of 3.1°C and 2.4°C for the reference simulation and the E1 
simulation, respectively (see Table 6). The warming is highest in the Northern 
Europe region (even by 0.5°C to 1°C warmer than Southern Europe), and lowest in 
the UK & Ireland region, for all climate simulations. 
Table 6. Temperature change (°C) in climate simulations for 2071-2100, compared to 1961-
1990 
Reference Reference variant 1
Reference 
variant 2 2°C
Northern Europe 3,8 4,8 3,4 3,2
UK & Ireland 2,1 2,9 1,7 1,4
Central Europe north 2,8 3,7 2,0 2,1
Central Europe south 3,0 3,8 2,0 2,1
Southern Europe 3,2 3,7 2,4 2,3
EU 3,1 3,9 2,4 2,4  
The overall change in precipitation (Table 7) is relatively small on a yearly basis for 
Southern Europe, whereas all simulations simulate higher precipitation at the end of 
the Century for Northern Europe. 
Table 7. Precipitation change (%) in climate simulations for 2071-2100, compared to 1961-
1990 
Reference Reference variant 1
Reference 
variant 2 2°C
Northern Europe 18 16 21 11
UK & Ireland 8 2 12 7
Central Europe north 8 1 15 3
Central Europe south 0 -7 5 -3
Southern Europe -19 -14 -14 -14
EU 1 -2 6 -1  
Annex 1 documents the temperature and precipitation variables for all the climate 
simulations considered in the JRC PESETA II study. 
                                                        
13 Compared to the pre-industrial level the global temperature increase in 1961-1990 would be about 
0.3°C.  
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Figure 6. Temperature and precipitation projections of the selected simulations for Northern 
Europe (NEU) and Southern Europe (SEU) 
NEU      SEU 
 
 
Note: Mean annual temperature (°C) and precipitation (mm/year) projections of the 
selected simulations. NEU (SEU) defined as land points with latitude higher (lower) 
than 50N. 
Temperature and precipitation changes, however, are seasonally and geographically 
very heterogeneous. Table 8 shows values14 of seasonal (winter and summer) 
temperature change (°C), as simulated by the core simulations, spatially averaged 
over the different regions. Generally the warming is highest in Northern Europe 
(NEU) in winter and in Southern Europe (SEU) in summer. Values vary greatly 
depending on regions and seasons but, generally, the Reference Variant 1 case 
                                                        
14 The values reported refer to the climate simulations of the first column in Table 4. 
RCP8.5
 
2°C run 
 
Reference variant 2 
 
Reference variant 1 
 
Reference 
 
Observations 
Years Years 
Temp. (°C) 
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projects the warmest climate change signal with temperature increase up to 4.5°C in 
winter for Northern Europa and 4.6°C for Central Europe South in summer. The 2°C 
scenario shows, on average, a temperature increase significantly smaller than all the 
A1B simulations, in winter, and similar to the Variant 2 simulation in summer. At 
continental level (EU) the increase is limited to 2.7°C in winter and 2.4°C in summer. 
Table 8. Seasonal (winter and summer) temperature change (°C) for 2071-2100, compared to 
1961-1990, as simulated by the core simulations 
Winter Reference simulation 
Reference 
Variant 1 
Reference 
Variant 2 2°C simulation 
Northern 
Europe 4.1 4.5 4.3 3.3 
UK & Ireland 1.8 2.4 2.2 1.4 
Central Europe 
North 3.2 3.6 3.2 2.0 
Central Europe 
South 3.5 4.1 3.3 2.5 
Southern 
Europe 2.9 3.3 2.8 1.7 
EU 3.5 4.0 3.6 2.7 
 
Summer Reference simulation 
Reference 
Variant 1 
Reference 
Variant 2 2°C simulation 
Northern 
Europe 2.8 4.2 1.7 2.1 
UK & Ireland 2.4 3.2 1.9 1.8 
Central Europe 
North 3.1 3.6 0.9 2.2 
Central Europe 
South 3.1 4.6 1.4 1.8 
Southern 
Europe 3.9 4.2 2.8 2.6 
EU 3.3 4.2 2.2 2.4 
Table 9 shows values of seasonal (winter and summer) precipitation change (%), as 
simulated by the core simulations. In winter, all simulations show an increase in 
projected precipitation, a part for the 2°C scenario, which shows a slight decrease (-
6.5%) over Southern Europe. The largest precipitation increase is found in Central 
Europe South for the Reference Variant 2 case (+31.5%), whereas over Southern 
Europe a very small change is expected, at the end of the century, compared to the 
1961-1990 period.   
Summer precipitation is projected to largely decrease in Southern Europe, according 
to all simulations. Larger discrepancies exist over the remaining regions, where the 
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Reference Variant 2 case shows a general increase in precipitation, in contrast to the 
other A1B and the 2°C simulations.  
Table 9. Seasonal precipitation change (%) in climate simulations for 2071-2100, compared to 
1961-1990, as simulated by the core simulations 
Winter Reference 
simulation 
Reference 
Variant 1 
Reference 
Variant 2 2°C simulation 
Northern 
Europe 
20.4 22.8 27.8 13.2 
UK & Ireland 17.4 10.2 15.1 1.5 
Central Europe 
North 
29.3 13.5 25.2 11.9 
Central Europe 
South 
28.1 30.5 31.5 12.4 
Southern 
Europe 
4.2 1.6 1.0 -6.5 
EU 12.2 11.8 14.1 1.6 
 
Summer Reference 
simulation 
Reference 
Variant 1 
Reference 
Variant 2 2°C simulation 
Northern 
Europe 
0.7 -4.8 14.8 0.15 
UK & Ireland -6.1 -14.5 6.1 -6.5 
Central Europe 
North 
-14.5 -12.1 11.0 -9.6 
Central Europe 
South 
-19.4 -24.4 4.8 -7.8 
Southern 
Europe 
-34.9 -30.2 -18.7 -20.9 
EU -10.1 -12.8 4.4 -6.3 
 
The difference amongst the core simulations in the geographical distribution of 
seasonal temperature and precipitation change is shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8, 
respectively. Projected temperature and precipitation increase (decrease) varies 
significantly even amongst the three simulations forced by the same A1B emission 
scenario. For instance, the Reference Variant 2 shows generally the coldest climate 
change signal, whereas the Reference Variant 1 the warmest one, especially in 
summer, although strong local variations exist (e.g. over Spain in summer). 
Differences in the precipitation signal are more evident in summer, especially over 
Central and Eastern Europe, where the Reference Variant 2 predicts an increase in 
precipitation, whereas the Reference Simulation and the Reference Variant 1 
simulations show the strongest negative signal. 
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Figure 7. Seasonal (winter and summer) temperature change (°C) for 2071-2100, compared to 
1961-1990, as simulated by the core simulations 
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Figure 8. Seasonal precipitation change (%) in climate simulations for 2071-2100, compared 
to 1961-1990, as simulated by the core simulations 
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Figure 9. Number of consecutive dry days, for 2071-2100 (summer), and its change compared 
to 1961-1990, as simulated by the core simulations 
  
                            
                        
                      
                   
          
 
Reference 
Run 
2°C 
2071-2100 Change compared to 1961-1990
 Consecutive dry days 
(left column)  
Change  
(right column) 
Reference 
Variant 2 
Reference 
Variant 1 
 49 
 
The importance of inter model variability is evident not only for the mean climate 
change signal, but also for extreme events, such as the number of consecutive dry 
days (CDD: i.e., days with daily precipitation less than 1mm), which may have a large 
influence on, e.g., hydrological or crop impact models. 
Results (Figure 9) show that, for the Reference Variant 1 simulation, a significant 
increase in the number of CDD is expected over large areas of Europe, including 
Central and Eastern Europe. On the contrary, the Reference Simulation shows a 
marked increase (more than 15 days) of CDD over Spain, and the Reference Variant 
2 an increase especially over Greece and Turkey.  
Summarizing, it is clear that climate models may predict very dissimilar changes in 
seasonal temperature and precipitation rate, even when driven by the same 
emission scenario. This inter model variability must be taken into account when 
using climate projections for impact assessment studies. However, the choice of 
simulations that maximise the model variability is highly subjective and it depends 
on many factors, including the variable, the season and the geographical area. 
3.4 Climate data input for the biophysical impact models 
Table 10 details the specific climate variables that have been used in each of the 
project sectoral studies. The coastal assessment only used sea level rise as a climate 
input. Most studies have used daily climate variables. While some sectors have 
considered a wide range of climate variables (e.g. river floods and agriculture), other 
sectors have required fewer variables (e.g. human health).  
It is interesting to note the richness of climate variables and high resolution used in 
the biophysical models, compared to the approach used in top-down models that 
use damage functions, usually only taking into account global average temperature 
(Ciscar et al., 2012a). 
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Table 10. Climate data input for the biophysical models 
Sector Input variables Time resolution Spatial Resolution
Maximum air temperature
Minimum air temperature
Total Precipitation
Global solar radiation 
Air relative humidity maximum and minimum
Wind speed
Reference evapotranspiration
Vapour pressure deficit
Average Temperature
Average Precipitation
Wind Speed
Maximum, Minimum and Average Temperature
Precipitation
Humidity
Windspeed
Solar + thermal radiation
Albedo
Dewpoint temperature
Average Air Temperature 
Relative Humidity
Wind Speed
Average Precipitation
Average Temperature 
Maximum Temperature
Extrene Precipitation
Tourism Average Temperature, wind speed, precipitation and humidity Daily NUTS 2 Regions
Average Temperature Annual; Monthly
Maximum Temperature Monthly
Minimum Temperature Monthly
Average Precipitation Annual; Monthly
Maximum Temperature (June-September)
Average Temperature 
Forest Species Habitat Suitability
Transport infrastructure
Human Health
Agriculture
River Floods, Droughts
Energy
Forest Fires
Daily
Daily
Daily
Daily
Daily 
Annual
25*25, 50*50 Km2
25*25, 50*50 Km2
NUTS 2 Regions
25*25, 50*50 Km2
25*25, 50*50 Km2
Country
25*25, 50*50 Km2
 
3.5 Sea level rise scenarios 
The sea level rise (SLR) projections come from the ClimateCost project (Brown et al. 
2011). For the A1B scenario, the medium projection for SLR (compared to the year 
2000) in the 2080s is 30 cm, and 18 cm for the E1 medium projection. The 
respective values for SLR in 2100 are 37 cm and 26 cm. The coastal impacts 
considered in this report relate to the SLR by the 2080s (see Table 11).  
Table 11. Sea level rise scenarios (cm) 
Simulations Variants 2080s 2100 
Low 22 26 
Medium 30 36 Reference simulation High 38 48 
Low 12 13 
Medium 18 21 2°C simulation High 25 29 
Source: Brown et al. (2011), Figure 2
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4 Biophysical impacts: methodologies and results  
Changes in climatic conditions are converted into biophysical impacts, and in some 
cases into damage costs, using a number of specific assessments undertaken as part 
of the JRC PESETA II and ClimateCost projects. This section presents for each of the 
biophysical impact areas both the bottom-up methodology and the main results. The 
chapter provides an overview of the essential elements of each biophysical impact 
assessment in order to interpret the results. Further details on the methodology and 
results can be found in the references provided in the respective subsections. The 
term biophysical impact refers to the outcome of the biophysical impact. It is 
equivalent to the term direct impact in this report.  
The following climate impact categories have been considered in the biophysical 
assessment: agriculture, energy, river floods, droughts, forest fires, transport 
infrastructure, coastal areas, tourism, habitat suitability of forest tree species, and 
human health.  
Table 12 provides an overview of the models and academic references for each of 
the assessments. Table 13 details the kind of output from each model (whether it is 
in biophysical or economic units, and whether it has been integrated into the 
economic model). Note that all results are in annual terms. 
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Table 12. Model and related references for the biophysical impacts  
Impact category Model Reference 
Agriculture 
(2020-2030) BioMA-CropSyst Donatelli et al. (2012b) 
Agriculture 
(2080s) DSSAT Iglesias et al. (2012) 
Energy POLES Dowling (2013) 
River floods LISFLOOD Rojas et al. (2013) 
Droughts LISFLOOD Forzieri et al. (2014) 
Forest fires Fire Weather Index (FWI) system Camia et al. (2013) 
Transport 
infrastructure 
Engineering-based 
damage functions and 
cost estimates 
Nemry and Demirel (2012) 
Coasts (Sea level 
rise) DIVA Brown et al. (2011) 
Tourism Econometric Barrios and Ibañez (2013) 
Habitat 
suitability of 
forest tree 
species 
Process model de Rigo et al. (2013a) 
Human Health Exposure-response functions Paci (2014) 
Source: JRC PESETA II project 
 
Unless otherwise stated, the results of the simulations regarding the 2080s refer to 
the average of the 2071-2100 period, as compared to the control period (usually 
1961-1990)15. 
                                                        
15 Some of the warming between the control and future periods has already occurred, so the computed 
effects are looking at somehow larger change than one would see compared to today. 
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Table 13. Kind of impacts in each impact area of the project 
Impact from the biophysical model Impact 
category in biophysical units in economic units 
Impacts 
into the 
CGE 
model 
Agriculture Crop yields (t/Ha)  Yes 
Energy 
Households and service 
sector heating and cooling 
demand (toe) 
 Yes 
River floods People affected 
Expected annual damage 
(€) 
 
Yes 
Droughts 
Expected Cropland 
affected (1000s km2/year), 
Expected People affected 
(million/year) 
 No 
Forest fires Burnt area (ha) Restoration cost (€) Yes 
Transport 
infrastructure  
Costs of asphalt and of 
bridge scouring (€) Costs 
of flooding and winter 
conditions (€) 
Potentially inundated 
roads due to sea level rise 
and sea storm surges 
(km) 
Yes 
Coasts (Sea 
level rise)   
Sea floods (€) 
Migration costs (€) Yes 
Tourism  Tourism expenditure (€) Yes 
Habitat 
suitability of 
forest tree 
species 
Index of habitat suitability 
(100)  No 
Human 
Health 
Mortality (number of 
deaths)  Yes 
Source: JRC PESETA II project 
4.1 Agriculture 2080s 
Agriculture impacts in terms of crop productivity changes are simulated for two 
time horizons (2020s-2030s and 2080s) with different agriculture models. 
Regarding the 2080s, the impacts are simulated with the DSSAT model, using the 
results from the FP7 ClimateCost project. Process-based crop responses to climate 
and management are simulated by using the DSSAT crop models for wheat, maize, 
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and soybeans16 (see Iglesias et al. 2012). The models simulate daily phenological 
development and growth in response to environmental factors (such as climate, 
including the effect of CO2) and management (considering crop variety, nitrogen 
fertilization and irrigation). The approach used statistical models of yield response 
to environmental variables and management variables for specific sites. Farm level 
adaptation has been considered in the following ways: planting date, nitrogen 
fertilizer, and water for irrigation. The main output of the 2080s assessment is the 
agriculture yield change. 
Table 14 shows the agriculture yield changes. Under the Reference scenario they are 
negative for the EU (11%), while there are productivity gains in the Northern 
Europe region (21%) and the Central Europe South region (2%). The region with the 
highest fall in agriculture yields is Southern Europe (20%). Under the 2°C scenario, 
EU agriculture yields barely change (a fall of 2%). While the estimated regional 
pattern is similar to that of the Reference scenario, for the UK & Ireland region there 
is a substantial difference, with a doubling of yield under the E1 simulation.  
Table 14. Impact on agriculture yields 
 
EU Northern Europe 
UK & 
Ireland 
Central 
Europe 
North 
Central 
Europe 
South 
Southern 
Europe 
Control 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Reference 89 121 98 91 102 80 
 change (%) -11 21 -2 -9 2 -20 
2°C 98 132 201 97 102 82 
 change (%) -2 32 101 -3 2 -18 
Units: index = 100 in control period 
4.2 Analysis of impacts on agriculture (2020-2030), including an 
evaluation of adaptation measures 
Within JRC PESETA II a second assessment of agriculture impacts has been made for 
the 2020s and 2030s, in comparison to a baseline centred on the year 2000, on the 
basis of the CropSyst crop model implemented within the BioMA modelling platform 
at JRC. This assessment is complementary to the one of the ClimateCost project on 
the 2080s and provides useful additional information at 25km x 25km resolution for 
                                                        
16 Livestock production is not considered in the agriculture assessment. 
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Europe. It also allows for the analysis of chosen adaptation measures to mitigate 
negative effects on crop yield.  
The effects of climate change on crop yield were estimated in the BioMA modelling 
platform17, which simulates interactions between crop, soil, weather and agro-
management. This included considering the effect of climate change with and 
without adaptation options, which consisted of using different plant varieties, 
different planting times and expansion of irrigation (for maize only) (Donatelli et al. 
2012b). The BioMA-based results were then fed into CAPRI, a partial equilibrium 
model of global agriculture, which considered the effect on land use and incomes in 
the EU, both with and without price changes in the rest of the world (Shrestha et al. 
2012).  
The analysis has been made for two A1B climate simulations: a “warm” (Reference 
Variant 1 in Table 4, METO-HC-HadRM3Q0-HadCM3Q0 simulation, or Hadley) and a 
“cold” (Reference Variant 2 in Table 4, DMI-HIRHAM5-ECHAM5 simulation, or 
ECHAM) simulation with regard to the air temperature development, averaged over 
Europe. The two simulations differ considerably also regarding the development of 
precipitation, especially in the Mediterranean region. A large part of the variability 
within all A1B simulations (chapter 3.3) is comprised with the two chosen 
simulations, thus defining a corridor of plausible outcomes for the subsequent crop 
growth model simulations. The analysis was run on the main European crops: 
wheat, rapeseed, grain maize, and sunflower.  
The climate data of the selected climate simulations have been post-processed to 
render all meteorological parameters consistent and realistic at a daily time step, 
and to allow for a sufficient sample size on the target horizons 2000 (baseline), 
2020, and 2030. Air temperature and precipitation were taken from the climate 
scenarios provided. Global radiation, wind speed, and air humidity were either not 
consistent or not available in the climate scenarios and therefore had to be 
estimated separately on the basis of 1996-2005 observations, as taken from the 
MARS meteorological database (WikiMCYFS 2013). In order to reflect the variability 
around the trend of the climate scenarios, a weather generator was used, increasing 
the sample size and creating 30 synthetic sample years around each of the three 
                                                        
17 http://bioma.jrc.ec.europa.eu/  
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horizons 2000, 2020, 2030. For each of the synthetic years the crop growth model 
CropSyst was run separately and results were subsequently combined in order to 
receive information on the average conditions around the time horizons envisaged 
(see Donatelli et al. 2012b for details). 
The CropSyst crop growth model was implemented at 25km grid size covering all 
EU-27. Crop growth model simulations were run at potential and water-limited 
production levels. Selected adaptation measures autonomously implemented by 
farmers were incorporated in a second round of crop model simulations. The 
measures chosen were a change in sowing date (thus anticipating or delaying 
sowing of crops), choosing a different crop variety with a different crop cycle length 
(thus shortening or lengthening the growing period), and changing the amount of 
irrigation water (for grain maize simulations only). 
The impact assessment of climate change on crops at 25 km grid scale has shown 
rather contrasting results in response to the two A1B climate simulations. The key 
aspect has been the changing rainfall pattern in Southern Europe – rather than the 
increase in air temperatures –, which can lead to either an improvement or a 
deterioration of the performance of crops. This has been especially evident for 
winter-sown crops, but also for sunflower that used the first part of the year to 
complete its growth cycle. In terms of impact assessment under water-limited 
production with no adaptation simulated, the different precipitation patterns led to 
a different response of rain-fed crops (wheat, rapeseed, and sunflower).  
The crop growth model simulation including technical adaptation has shown in 
many cases an alleviation of the impacts, especially under the “cold” scenario 
(Reference Variant 2) in Southern Europe in general, and with a more modest 
effectiveness in southern Spain. Yield estimates in many areas showed 
improvements under the “warm” scenario (Reference Variant 1) in Southern 
Europe, too. Wheat, rapeseed, and maize showed generalised improvements in 
Northern Europe, whereas sunflower did not perform well for both climate 
simulations of the A1B emission scenario in a large belt from central France to the 
most eastern area of Europe considered. It must be pointed out that such results 
were obtained via adjustment of technical management, without assuming a 
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technological advance (e.g., known varieties were simulated, without exploring 
possibly improved varieties).  
The results of the crop growth model simulations of wheat, as the dominant crop in 
Europe, are presented in Figure 10 in detail. The resulting wheat yields are rather 
different when based on the “warm” and the “cold” climate simulations of the A1B 
scenario (Reference Variant 1 and 2, respectively). Figure 10 summarises the 
expected situation of water-limited wheat yields in 2020 (the two columns of maps 
on the left) and 2030 (the two columns of maps on the right) according to the crop 
model setup used. For simulations without considering any adaptation (upper row), 
the differences in spatial patterns of yield reflect the substantial differences in 
rainfall patterns between the Hadley (Reference Variant 1) and ECHAM (Reference 
Variant 2) simulations (Donatelli et al. 2012a). The reason for an increase of yields 
in Southern Europe when rainfall is available (i.e., in the “warm” or Reference 
Variant 1 simulation) is the shortening of the crop cycle that may impact positively 
yields by improving the avoidance to summer water stress. The positive effect of 
avoidance of summer stress was already observed via simulation with different GCM 
inputs at a location of Southern Italy (Donatelli et al. 1998; Harrison and Butterfield 
1996). Carbon fertilization is also expected to contribute to the increase in yield 
given the current estimates of CO2 concentrations in the near future, markedly 
higher than the ones of the first studies of simulations of crop growth in future 
scenarios of the 1990’s.  
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Figure 10. Change (%) in simulated water-limited yield with and without adaptation measures 
for winter wheat in 2020 and 2030 with respect to 2000 
 
Note: The best adaptation strategies among all tested ones are mapped in the 
bottom row. 
The results of the crop model simulation runs with adaptation strategies 
implemented (middle row) show a general improvement of yields over all of Europe, 
except for the Iberian Peninsula based on the ECHAM (Reference Variant 2) 
simulation, which suffers from excessive aridity. The choice of adaptation measures 
(represented in the bottom row of the figure) reveals that the best yield is realized 
by delaying wheat planting date by 10 days, and using a variety with a longer 
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growth cycle. It must be noted, however, that the results do not account for a 
possible increase in plant disease pressure such as wheat rusts.  
At the 2030 horizon, the same 2020 general conclusions can be drawn. The yield 
increases with adaptation are slightly lower than with respect to 2020 due to a 
generalized increase in temperature.  
An important outcome of the crop growth model simulations based on the “warm” 
climate simulation (Reference Variant 1), which estimates an increase in rainfall, is 
that yields are expected to increase in Southern Europe even without adaptation 
because of rainfall patterns and CO2 fertilization. The general picture presented by 
these simulations – certainly to be corroborated by further analysis – shows 
substantially different outcomes from the generalized concept that agriculture will 
become unsustainable in Southern Europe. There will likely be critical spots, but 
possibilities deriving from climate scenarios do not exclude also opportunities at the 
time horizon considered. At the same time, the results confirm that the increase of 
temperature will both broaden agricultural management options and lead to 
potentially higher yield levels in Northern Europe.  
4.3 Energy 
The energy assessment computes the impact of changes in ambient temperature and 
rainfall on the energy system, focusing on heating and cooling demand for 
residential and commercial sectors, based on the POLES energy model. The POLES 
model18 (Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems) is a global partial 
equilibrium simulation model. Although POLES is usually used to produce dynamic 
energy scenarios up to 2050, for the PESETA project, the climate of the 2080s was 
imposed on the present-day energy market. 
Heating and cooling demand depend on the changes in degree days, as computed 
from the climate simulations. The POLES analysis also considered the effects of 
climate change on the efficiency of thermal power plants and changes in hydro, wind 
(both on- and off-shore) and solar PV electricity output. The changes in hydro 
                                                        
18 The POLES model description can be found at http://ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu/activities/energy-and-
transport/documents/POLESdescription.pdf  
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production were computed using output from the LISFLOOD model19. The energy 
impacts can be considered steady-state impacts because they exclude extreme, 
short-lived impacts that cannot be captured because of both lack of climate data and 
incompatibility with the POLES energy model. 
While the results presented in this report are based on a comparative static analysis 
(exploring how energy demand would change in today's economy, but with future 
climate), Dowling (2013) also conducted a dynamic assessment in the 2050 time 
horizon, which includes the influence of long-term socioeconomic trends (not 
considered in this report) but does not include the linkages between energy and the 
rest of the economy (included in this report's CGE analysis).  
The POLES energy model projects the change in energy demand and supply as a 
result of climate change. The sum of the change in heating and cooling demand is 
reported in tons of oil equivalent, a synthesis of the outcome of the energy model20. 
Table 15 represents the energy demand indicator for the EU and various sub-
regions in the two climate simulations. By the end of the century, overall EU energy 
demand would fall by 13% under the Reference scenario, compared to the 
respective control period (1961-1990). With the exception of the Southern Europe 
region, there would be net energy savings, being the Central Europe North region 
the one with the highest fall in energy consumption, by 21%. Energy demand would 
rise by 8% in Southern Europe. Under the 2°C scenario, EU energy consumption 
would fall to a lesser extent, by 7%. The regional pattern is similar to that of the 
Reference scenario.  
                                                        
19 Variations in rainfall lead to changes in surface water at each hydropower station. These outputs from 
LISFLOOD were used as inputs to the hydropower module of the POLES model. 
20 The energy assessment of this study reports energy demand changes. The POLES model also computes 
the effects of the climate impact on hydro, wind, and solar PV electricity output, and electricity output 
from thermal power stations. Those supply-side effects also would influence indirectly energy demand via 
price effects. 
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Table 15. Impact on energy demand 
 
EU Northern Europe 
UK & 
Ireland 
Central 
Europe 
North 
Central 
Europe 
South 
Southern 
Europe 
Control 259,429 7,194 40,701 92,026 69,868 49,639 
Reference 226,487 6,137 34,926 73,003 58,907 53,513 
 change (%) -13 -15 -14 -21 -16 8 
2°C 240,556 6,425 38,804 81,504 63,707 50,116 
 change (%) -7 -11 -5 -11 -9 1 
Units: ktoe/year 
4.4 River floods 
Estimates of changes in the frequency and severity of river floods are based on 
simulations with the LISFLOOD model (Rojas et al., 2013) followed by extreme value 
analysis (Rojas et al. 2012). LISFLOOD is a hydrological model developed for flood 
forecasting and impact assessment studies at European scale. Driven by 
meteorological input, LISFLOOD calculates actual evaporation and transpiration 
rates based on vegetation characteristics, leaf area index and soil properties. The 
model uses a 5-km grid resolution covering Europe and generates river runoff 
estimates for each river pixel. Flood discharges for eight return periods ranging 
between 2 and 500 years are computed and converted into flood inundation extents 
and depths. The depth estimates are then translated into direct monetary damage 
from contact with floodwaters using country-specific flood depth-damage functions 
and land use information. The main outcome of the modelling approach is twofold: 
the expected annual damage (EAD) and expected annual population affected (EAPA). 
The floods study also assesses the costs and benefits of maintaining 1 in 100-year 
levels of flood protection across Europe in future time periods, set against the 
increases in flood magnitude. This is done by transferring information from detailed 
flood protection studies covering a wide range of protection measures and 
geographical areas across Europe. 
Direct economic damages from flooding for the EU are currently21 estimated at 
around 5 billion Euro/year (Table 16), which compares well to the 4.4 billion Euro 
of annual damage reported over the period 1998-2009 (EEA, 2010). Flood damages 
                                                        
21 The control period value is the average of the control period outcome under the Reference and the 2°C 
simulations. The same applies for the coastal impact control period. 
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for the Reference climate realization are projected to more than double due to 
climate change compared to the control period, reaching 11.4 billion Euro/year in 
the 2080s under the Reference scenario. This increase in damages would occur 
mainly in the UK & Ireland region, where damages are tripled up to 3.3 billion 
Euro/year and the Central Europe South region, where damages raise from ca. 2 
billion Euro/year up to 5.2 billion Euro/year. Southern Europe would also 
experience a considerable increase in damages totalling to 1.3 billion Euro/year. 
Northern Europe is the only region where the assessment projects a decrease in 
damages (-40%), amounting to 222 million Euro/year, under the Reference 
simulation22. Regarding the climate realization for the 2°C scenario, future damages 
at EU-level are in general smaller compared to the realization for the Reference 
scenario, reaching 9.5 billion Euro/year by the end of this century.  
Table 16. Impact on river flood damages 
 
EU Northern Europe 
UK & 
Ireland 
Central 
Europe 
North 
Central 
Europe 
South 
Southern 
Europe 
Control 4,924 370 872 1,007 2,003 673 
Reference 11,338 222 3,317 1,248 5,203 1,347 
 change (%) 130 -40 281 24 160 100 
2°C 9,537 292 3,715 1,269 3,073 1,187 
 change (%) 94 -21 326 26 53 76 
Units: €million/year 
The flood analysis also calculated the number of people affected on an annual basis 
by flooding. Whereas currently approximately 160,000 people/year are affected by 
flooding in the EU, by the end of this century this is projected to rise to 290,000 
people/year under the Reference climate realization. Under the 2°C climate 
realization the total number of people annually affected in the EU by the 2080s 
would be 240,000. The largest increase in number of people affected is projected for 
the UK under both scenarios. 
It should be noted that the above results are based on a single member (Reference 
Simulation) of the 12-member A1B ensemble and one realization of the 3-member 
E1 ensemble. As shown in Rojas et al. (2013), flood damages are strongly dependent 
on the choice of climate realization due to the large uncertainties in projections of 
                                                        
22 For the whole ensemble, there is no reduction in the future damages for any of the regions. 
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future changes in precipitation and its extremes. This is even more pronounced at 
the regional to local scales, as shown in Figure 11. This figure shows the spatial 
distribution of the absolute changes in annual expected direct damages (AED) 
between the 2080s and control period (1961-1990) for the 12 climate realizations 
of the A1B ensemble (the results of the Reference climate simulation correspond to 
plate g of Figure 11). The results for the individual climate realizations reveal that 
the potential costs can vary by a factor of two (higher or lower). These differences 
are even more significant at the regional or country level, with some models even 
reporting differences in the effects of climate change (i.e., some models project 
relative reductions in future flood risk from climate change for some areas). The 
strong dependence of the results on the chosen climate realization explains for 
example why the 2°C climate realization shows higher future damages in the UK 
compared to the climate realization chosen for the Reference.   
For the whole A1B ensemble of 12 climate simulations the EAD is projected to 
increase up to nearly 15 billion Euro/year by the 2080s due to effects of climate 
change, whereas for the E1 ensemble of 3 climate simulations the EAD from flooding 
is projected to amount to 9 billion Euro/year by the end of this century.  
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Figure 11. Relative change in EAD from flooding between 2080s and baseline period for the 12 
climate model combinations for the A1B scenario 
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The floods study also assesses the damages from flooding when accounting for 
changes in exposure and population, as defined by the underlying socio-economic 
scenarios. This analysis complements the previous one, which was made in a 
comparative static framework. In this dynamic case, the EAD for the A1B scenario is 
estimated at €98 billion/year by the 2080s (mean ensemble results, current values, 
undiscounted) in the EU27. Hence, a large part of this is due to socio-economic 
change (economic growth). Analysis at the country level shows high climate-related 
costs in the UK, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium. For the 3-member E1 
ensemble, EAD is projected to increase to €68 billion/year due to the combined 
effects of climate and socio-economic changes.  
When accounting for demographic changes, the projected mean expected number of 
people (EAP) affected by flooding annually is 360,000 and 230,000 for the A1B and 
E1 scenario (ensemble average), respectively, by the 2080s in the EU27. For both 
scenarios this is about 30,000 people less compared to when assuming static 
population, due to the projected decline in population in the second halve of this 
century.  
The benefits of adaptation (in this case upgrading to future 1 in 100-year flood 
levels across Europe) is estimated at €53 billion/year for the A1B by the 2080s 
(mean ensemble, EU27, climate and socio-economic change current values, 
undiscounted). It should be noted that the benefits vary with the climate variability, 
so there is a significant range around these values. There are also significant residual 
damages in later years under these minimum protection levels, and this suggests 
higher protection levels would be justified. The costs to maintain minimum 
protection levels are estimated at €7.9 billion/year for the A1B scenario and €4.7 
billion/year for the E1 scenario by the 2080s for the EU27 (mean ensemble, 
undiscounted).  
The following limitations of the floods study should be considered:  
• Only one hydrological model is used to simulate river flows, hence hydrological 
uncertainty is not accounted for.  
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• Flood return levels are estimated using extreme value analysis based on 
simulated time series of 30 years, which may result in large extrapolation errors 
for high return periods.  
• In the calculation of river water levels, river cross sections had to be 
approximated due to the absence of national or European datasets on riverbed 
geometries.  
• Inaccuracies in the SRTM DEM may induce bias in the estimation of flood 
inundation levels.  
• Changes in land use and land cover are not incorporated in the climate runs or in 
the economic impact evaluation due to the absence of reasonable macro-scale 
land use change scenarios for the scenarios considered herein. This may result in 
an underestimation of future flood risk. 
• Flood protection levels vary largely across Europe and within countries. There is, 
however, a deplorable lack of information on flood protection standards and the 
probability of failure of defences in Europe. We have therefore assumed current 
flood protection up to the 100-year event, with the exception of the Netherlands 
where the 150-year event was applied. For the future time slices, we assumed 
the same level of protection in terms of return period (hence protection up to 
future 100-year, or 150 for the Netherlands, event). 
• The approach used is based on direct estimated potential flood damage caused 
by water depths on land use typologies. Other factors that might contribute to 
the increase of losses, such as flood velocity, building characteristics, content of 
sediment in water, as well as indirect economic losses, are not included in this 
study.  
The above list of assumptions implies that the monetary estimates of flood damage 
presented herein are inherently uncertain. It should be noted, however, that the goal 
of this study was to evaluate changes in flood damage due to climate change, rather 
than to estimate absolute values of flood damage. Given that most of the 
assumptions apply to both the control and scenario period it can be expected that 
estimates of changes in flood damage are relatively less affected by the assumptions 
compared to the absolute flood damage estimates. Furthermore, the validation of 
the flood damage estimates for the control period compare relatively well with the 
reported damage figures and estimates of flood damage from other studies. 
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4.5 Droughts 
The streamflow droughts analysis is based on hydrological simulations performed 
with the LISFLOOD model (see description in subsection 4.4) driven by the A1B 
ensemble of 12 climate realisations. Annual minimum flows are extracted from the 
daily LISFLOOD simulations for all river cells across Europe, and using extreme 
value analysis based on the Generalised Extreme Value (GEV) distribution the 
changes in drought frequency and magnitude were evaluated between the 2080s 
and control period (see Forzieri et al., 2014). Climate impact indicators are 
expressed as total area and cropland affected and people exposed to droughts. As 
droughts are probabilistic events, the results are presented as expected annual 
impacts. 
It should be noted that the impacts here are not monetized and do not include 
consequences on several other sectors that may be negatively impacted by droughts, 
such as energy production and navigation. It is assumed that the threshold to be 
affected is the current 20-year minimum flow, i.e. that crop productivity or people 
suffer negative impacts from low flows that occur once in 20 years or less frequent. 
For each of these variables it is first calculated the expected annual damage for the 
baseline period by integrating the impacts over events with a lower probability of 
occurrence than the 20-year threshold. For the 2080s, the future return period of 
the baseline 20-year minimum flow is calculated by inversion of the GEV function, 
and is then used to truncate the integration and estimate the corresponding future 
expected annual damage. The analysis is performed at the LISFLOOD setup 5x5 km 
pixel scale and results are then aggregated to NUTS2, country scale and EU regions 
(see Figure 2). For cropland affected, all land use classes related to crops have been 
selected from the refined European land use/cover map (based on Corine) at 
100x100 m (Batista e Silva et al., 2013a). For population exposed we used the high-
resolution (100x100 m) population grid map for Europe (Batista e Silva et al., 
2013b). 
Table 17 shows that the EU cropland area affected by droughts is projected to 
increase substantially under the A1B Reference climate simulation, reaching 
700,000 km2/year, from nearly 100,000 km2/year in the control period. The highest 
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absolute increase would occur in Southern Europe (from 27,000 km2/year to 
365,000 km2/year) and Central Europe South (from 31,000 km2/year to 242,000 
km2/year). In the UK & Ireland region the relative change is similar (almost six times 
more surface affected). In contrast, Northern Europe and Central Europe North 
show a reduction and a relatively small augmentation, respectively, in impacts on 
croplands in the future scenario, with respect to control period. 
 Table 17. Impact on Cropland affected by drought  
 
EU Northern Europe 
UK & 
Ireland 
Central 
Europe 
North 
Central 
Europe 
South 
Southern 
Europe 
Control 96 8 8 22 31 27 
Reference 710 2 61 25 217 405 
 change (%) 637 -77 627 16 601 1,407 
Units: Thousand km2/year 
Table 18 represents the effects on people affected by drought. The Reference 
simulation could mean a large increase in EU people affected23, from 22 million/year 
in the control simulation to 144 million/year. The largest absolute increase would 
also occur in the Southern Europe region, with an increase of almost 70 million 
people/year. The Central Europe South and the UK & Ireland regions would also see 
large increases in the scenario period, more than five times the currently affected 
population. Interestingly, Central Europe North will experience much stronger 
impacts on people than cropland affected by drought (compare Table 17 and Table 
18). This suggests that in this region the populated areas are more susceptible to 
increased drought than the agricultural areas. As with cropland, Northern Europe's 
exposure to drought among the population shows an opposite direction of projected 
impacts compared to other regions, with a reduction of ca. 80% in exposure of 
population to drought. 
                                                        
23 Under a dynamic assessment where the evolution of population would be considered the results could 
be interpreted in a different way, depending on whether the population would increase or decrease 
compared to today. 
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Table 18. Impact on People affected by drought 
 
EU Northern Europe 
UK & 
Ireland 
Central 
Europe 
North 
Central 
Europe 
South 
Southern 
Europe 
Control 22 1 3 7 6 5 
Reference 153 0 18 18 37 80 
 change (%) 592 -66 560 153 642 1,378 
Units: million people/year 
It is important to note that these results relate to the specific realization (Reference) 
of the A1B ensemble. However, similar analysis has been conducted for twelve A1B 
simulations. The projections of streamflow droughts show to be very robust 
amongst the different climate simulations. This is because, unlike floods, changes in 
low-flow conditions depend on changes in precipitation on longer (i.e., monthly to 
seasonal) timescales rather than on single events. The evolution in this century of 
the changes in total area affected for the A1B ensemble of 12 climate simulations is 
shown in Figure 12.  
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Figure 12. Change in total area affected by drought due to climate change (SRES A1B scenario) 
between baseline period and current (a), 2020s (b), 2050s (c) and 2080s (d). Ensemble-
median results based on 12 RCM/GCM combinations 
 
The different steps in the chain “emissions → climate → extreme flow → drought 
hazard → impact” are subject to uncertainty. When applying the framework 
outlined above for macro-scale drought impact assessment it was necessary to 
adopt the following assumptions, which should be kept in mind when interpreting 
the results:  
• Only one hydrological model is used to simulate river flows, hence hydrological 
uncertainty is not accounted for.  
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• Drought return levels are estimated using extreme value analysis based on 
simulated time series of 30 years, which may result in large extrapolation errors 
for high return periods.  
• Changes in land use and land cover are not incorporated in the climate runs or in 
the drought impact evaluation due to the absence of reasonable macro-scale land 
use change scenarios for the scenarios considered herein. This may result in bias 
in the estimates of future drought impacts. 
• Drought vulnerability is not included in the impact analysis, and may vary widely 
in Europe.  
• Impacts of droughts go far beyond those addressed in this study. Future work 
will focus on addressing the effects of droughts and low flows on several other 
socio-economic sectors such as energy production and navigation as well as on 
ecological systems. 
4.6 Forest fires 
The assessment of the impact of forest fires is based on the statistical modelling of 
burnt area as a function of meteorological fire danger indices (documented in Camia 
et al., 2013). The study first reconstructs the historical series of the Canadian Fire 
Weather Index (FWI) system components to estimate past meteorological fire 
danger conditions and to model their relationship with the observed burnt area in 
Southern Europe.  
In a second step the burnt area projected under climate change scenarios is 
simulated by feeding the statistical models with future fire danger indices 
projections. Figure 13 shows maps of FWI differences of 2071-2100 and 1961-1990 
annual averages, which represent the climate change signal over the fire danger 
indicator adopted. Despite the marked differences in spatial pattern across 
simulations, especially for the reference scenario, it is recognizable a consistent 
stronger positive signal of A1B against E1. 
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Figure 13. Difference of FWI annual averages between 2071-2100 and 1961-1990 simulations 
 
Based on fire danger projections and on the statistical models developed, estimates 
of future burnt area are simulated by country. The economic valuation of the forest 
fire impacts is made combining the burnt area estimates with a European map of 
post-fire restoration costs per hectare. Therefore the two final outputs of the 
appraisal are the burnt area and the restoration costs.  
The estimated burnt area and the consequent restoration costs summarise the 
impacts of forest fires. They have been computed only for Southern European 
countries and Southern France, i.e. the European regions by far most affected by 
forest fires (85% of the current total EU burnt area), therefore this indicator is not 
reported for other EU regions.  
Table 19 shows the area burnt by forest fires in the most affected regions of the EU 
i.e., Southern European countries and Southern France. In this regions the burnt 
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area is estimated to double under the Reference scenario (from 377 thousand ha 
under the control to 787 thousand ha under the Reference simulation), and could 
increase by near 50% under the 2°C simulation. 
Table 19. Impact on forest fires (burnt area) 
 
Southern 
Europe 
Control 361,203 
Reference 734,889 
change (%) 103 
2°C 526,002 
change (%) 46 
Units: ha 
Several uncertainties hold when projecting long-term climate change impacts on 
forest fires. The current assessment is based on the main driver of fire regime in 
Mediterranean Europe (weather) which explains most of the year by year variation 
of fire activity but does not take into account longer term changes such as fuel 
conditions (vegetation), ignitions, and human activities that may influence burnt 
area and thus wildfire impact. The uncertainties of future projections are also 
intrinsic to the empirical nature of the models developed, since extreme conditions 
simulated in future climate scenarios can be outside the data range used to build and 
calibrate the models with today observations. 
With respect to the economic impact, the restoration cost approach, which has been 
followed to assess the damage value, underestimates the actual economic losses. 
Costs which are not accounted for are those incurred because of the missed benefits 
until the forest is restored (i.e., temporary loss of ecosystem services), or the direct 
cost of firefighting. Other associated costs related to indirect effects of wildfires on 
aspects such as human health or secondary effects on other natural hazards, such as 
e.g. increased potential for flooding, are also not accounted for.  
Adaptation measures could not be included in the models since no comprehensive 
baseline information is currently available on wildfire prevention in Europe hence, 
the current quantitative knowledge about the effectiveness of different fire 
prevention options is still limited.  
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4.7 Transport infrastructure 
In the future, transport could be affected by one or several simultaneous changes in 
the climate conditions, including hotter summers, extreme precipitation events, 
increased storminess and sea level rise. If such impacts are not anticipated in future 
transport infrastructure design and maintenance, those changing weather 
conditions could, in some regions, accelerate their deterioration, increase severe 
damages risks, traffic interruption and accidents which could, on their turn, affect 
economic activities. 
Methodology 
The transport infrastructure assessment by Nemry and Demirel (2012) considered 
the effects of change in temperature, precipitation, river floods and of sea level rise 
(including storm surges) on the future costs of road and rail networks. It has drawn 
some future trends regarding changing exposure of road and rail infrastructures to 
weather-induced risk under climate change, considering two future time intervals 
(2040-2070 and 2070-2100), and future infrastructure deterioration and damage 
costs. Costs associated with some selected adaptation cases were also assessed, 
covering different aspects of climate change, infrastructure types and involved life 
spans. This has been performed at high geographical resolution and higher 
aggregation level.  
The following impacts and adaptation measures were considered: 
• Extreme precipitation was analysed by adjusting estimates of current costs to 
road infrastructures to take account the estimated future precipitation conditions.  
• The effects of higher road temperatures were analysed in two ways. Firstly, 
the cost of maintaining roads under higher temperatures (using asphalt binder 
upgrades) was made by applying a method developed by Chinowski et al. (2013), 
making use of the information about the EU road network using the Transtools 
model. Secondly, the consequences of milder winter conditions on road maintenance 
costs were estimated based on analysis by the US Highways Administration (FHWA, 
2006). 
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• The increased risk of heat-induced rail track buckling was calculated by 
estimating the number of days at which country-specific "stress-free" temperatures 
would be exceeded. These are then converted into number of hours delay due to 
additional speed restrictions, which are monetised on a value-of-time basis.  
• The effect of bridge scour (damage to the foundations of bridges from 
increased river flow causing removal of sediment) was estimated using the outputs 
from LISFLOOD hydrological model combined with transport network information 
and estimates of the need for additional expenditure on riprap (placing large blocks 
at the base of bridge piers) or concrete reinforcement (Wright et al, 2012) .  
• Finally, the vulnerability of the road transport infrastructure to a 1 meter sea 
level rise (permanent inundation) and storm surges (episodic inundation) was 
analysed using a combination of digital elevation data from the NASA Shuttle Radar 
Topography Mission (SRTM), storm surge estimates from the DIVA model database  
and road network data from Teleatlas. Vulnerability of transport network to coastal 
inundation was estimated as the cost of reconstruction.  
The damage to roads, railways and bridges has been retained as a proper indicator 
of damage to transport infrastructure. Other transportation infrastructure, such as 
airports, ports, pipelines is not explored. 
Future weather-induced impacts on road infrastructures 
Even though integrity and serviceability of transport infrastructure, including their 
resilience to current weather conditions, are key objectives in infrastructures 
construction and maintenance standards, complete avoidance of weather-induced 
infrastructure deterioration and failures is not economically feasible. For road 
transport infrastructures, weather stresses currently represent from 30% to 50% of 
current road maintenance costs in Europe (8 to 13 billon €/year). About 10% of 
these costs (~0.9 billion €/year) are associated with extreme weather events alone, 
in which extreme heavy rainfalls & floods events represent the first contribution.  
The JRC/IPTS study concludes that, at EU27 aggregated level, average precipitation-
induced normal degradation of road transport infrastructures will only slightly 
increase in the future. However, more frequent extreme precipitations (and river 
floods and pluvial floods) as projected in different regions in Europe could represent 
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an extra cost for road transport infrastructures (50-192 million €/year for the A1B 
scenarios, period 2040-2100). 
The increase in annual damage costs to road infrastructure from extreme 
precipitation for 2070-2100 (compared to the present) is represented in Table 20. 
This expenditure is projected to increase by 50% in the Reference scenario, to €932 
million. The increase is similar across the considered EU regions, but for the 
Southern Europe area, where it barely changes. Under the 2°C scenario, the overall 
EU increase is lower, to €773 million. The regional changes compared to the control 
simulation are similar to those of the Reference scenario, with the exception of the 
Central Europe North region (with a lower increase in expenditure, of 4% under the 
2°C simulation versus 70% in the Reference simulation) and Southern Europe (a fall 
of 16% under the 2°C simulation24, while it was more or less stable in the Reference 
simulation).  
Table 20. Additional flood-induced damages to road infrastructure for the period 2070-2100 
 
EU Northern Europe 
UK & 
Ireland 
Central 
Europe 
North 
Central 
Europe 
South 
Southern 
Europe 
Control 629 130 59 209 109 122 
Reference 932 210 89 356 156 121 
 change (%) 48 61 52 70 44 -1 
2°C 773 210 90 218 152 102 
 change (%) 23 62 53 4 40 -16 
Units: million Euro/year 
Milder winter conditions are projected to result in reduced costs for road 
infrastructure (-170 to -508 million €/year for the A1B scenarios). On the contrary, 
increasing average temperature could require changes in maintenance operations 
and practices and represent extra costs for both road transports.  
The reduction in road infrastructure costs due to warmer temperatures is shown in 
Table 21. This consists of cost reduction due to reductions in winter conditions (the 
incidence of freezing days) and cost increase due to the need to upgrade asphalt 
                                                        
24 This fall could be due to less precipitation.  
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binder. As the table shows, the cost reduction related to winter conditions is 
expected to exceed the cost of asphalt binder upgrade in each region25.  
Table 21. Annual change in costs to road network associated with changing extreme 
temperatures 
 
EU Northern Europe 
UK & 
Ireland 
Central 
Europe 
North 
Central 
Europe 
South 
Southern 
Europe 
Change in winter damage costs 
Reference -327 -3 -6 -50 -69 -199 
2°C -260 -16 -7 -127 -73 -127 
Change in asphalt binder costs 
Reference 193 1 2 80 68 42 
2°C 68 1 0 16 21 29 
Units: million Euro/year 
Protection of river bridges against scour risk may be needed over the next decades 
for about 20% of the river bridge stock because of increasing intensity of peak river 
discharges. Given the long bridge design life (>100 years) and long maintenance 
planning cycle, future climate-related risk should be included in corresponding prior 
cost-benefit studies. The annual cost of protecting bridges is estimated at €541 
million for the period 2040-2070 and €383 million for the period 2070-2100. 
For heat-induced rail buckling risk and derailment risk, the most commonly applied 
adaptation measure consists in speed limitation. Today the entailed delays 
represent a small cost for transport users. Due to more intense and frequent hot 
days in summer, this could induce more frequent trip delays for rail transport 
(doubled or quadrupled for the A1B and RCP8.5 scenarios respectively).  The study 
estimates the cost of speed restrictions - calculated to €31-39 million. 
Altogether, the impacts noted above suggest an additional net annual cost of around 
€590 million at EU level for the period 2070-2100.  
For the case of road infrastructure adaptations considered, compared with 
maintenance costs, the adaptation costs estimated for the A1B scenarios (314-560 
million €/year) represent a small percentage of current road maintenance costs 
(1.2% to 2.2%). However, damage costs which would be avoided by such adaptation 
                                                        
25  It is to be noted that reduced costs for Southern regions might be overestimated due to the poor 
representativeness of data for those regions. 
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measures could be several times higher. The cost of bridge failure could easily reach 
2 to 10 times the cost of the bridge itself.  
Vulnerability to sea level rise and sea storm surges 
This study has produced an initial estimate of future risk of sea level rise and sea 
storm surges on road transport infrastructures. This assessed risk is based on 
infrastructure settled in areas lying below a level defined by the sum of sea level rise 
(1 m) and 100-year sea storm surge height. The infrastructure at risk of permanent 
or episodic inundation represents 4.1% of the coastal infrastructure. The value of 
that infrastructure is estimated to ~18.5 billion €.  
Overall, these costs provide a highly aggregated picture of the possible trends for 
road transport in Europe. More severe consequences at local or regional level are 
not excluded, implying both more significant increase in repairing and maintaining 
infrastructures spending, and indirect consequences (e.g. fatalities due to extreme 
weather events) where infrastructures would collapse. For instance, current 
patterns about extreme precipitation show a very uneven spatial distribution. 
4.8 Coasts 
Coastal impacts are in general derived from the DIVA (Dynamic Interactive 
Vulnerability Assessment) model, as simulated in the ClimateCost project (Brown et 
al. 2011). DIVA is an integrated model of coastal systems that assesses the 
biophysical and socioeconomic impacts of sea level rise and socio-economic 
development. Depending on the relative sea level rise, several types of bio-physical 
impacts are evaluated for each coastline segment, including dry land loss due to 
coastal erosion, and flooding due to surges and the backwater effect on rivers. The 
model can consider two public adaptation options: dike building/raising and 
beach/shore nourishment. The model results used in the JRC PESETA II project 
assume that there is not public adaptation. The model computes impacts in 
monetary terms such as migration costs and sea floods costs. 
The cost of damages from sea floods is one of two the main economic impact 
categories from the DIVA model. The other main category is cost of migration, which 
is correlated to damage costs but is not reported here. The other impact categories, 
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such as land losses have less relative importance in economic terms. The results 
without public adaptation are reported here. 
Table 22 represents the estimated damages due to sea floods. For the EU they could 
more than triple under the Reference simulation, mainly due to the increase of 
projected damages in the Central Europe North region, the region with the highest 
sea flood damages across the EU. In that region the sea flood damages could increase 
from €2.6 billion/year in the control period to €9.4 billion/year in the Reference 
simulation. The relative increase in damages is the highest in the Southern Europe 
region (from €163 million /year in the control simulation to over €1 billion/year in 
the Reference simulation, an increase of almost 600%). The Northern Europe region 
also experiences a large increase of sea flood damages (from €225 million/year in 
the control simulation to over €1billion/year in the Reference simulation, an 
increase of over 300%).  
Under the 2°C simulation, associated with lower increases in sea level, the sea flood 
damages are lower for the EU and for each of the EU regions, when compared to the 
Reference simulation damages. Still the damages increase substantially compared to 
the control simulation, with EU damages more than doubling to reach €13.8 
billion/year. 
Table 22. Impact on sea floods damage 
 
EU Northern Europe 
UK & 
Ireland 
Central 
Europe 
North 
Central 
Europe 
South 
Southern 
Europe 
Control 4,963 225 966 2,613 997 163 
Reference 17,159 1,035 2,987 9,438 2,634 1,065 
 change (%) 246 361 209 261 164 555 
2°C 13,787 553 2,464 7,778 2,089 903 
 change (%) 178 146 155 198 110 455 
Units: million Euro/year 
4.9 Tourism 
The tourism study is documented in Barrios and Ibañez (2013). The tourism model 
estimates changes in tourism revenues according to an econometric analysis of the 
relationship between regional tourism demand (bednights at NUTS2 level) and 
regional climate conditions. The tourism demand equation considers as explanatory 
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variables the tourists´ valuation of climatic conditions (a hedonic price index) 
including the transport26 and accommodation27 cost dimension of tourism demand. 
Such modelling system allows one to consider adaptation options in terms of timing 
and duration of holiday's patterns.  
The analysis is organised in three main steps. In the first step the hedonic price 
equations are econometrically estimated to derive the hedonic price index of 
tourism services and associated marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) of tourists for 
climate amenities in EU regions. Four different climate explanatory variables are 
used taking monthly average of daily figures: average temperature level, average 
level of precipitation, average humidity and average wind speed. These variables are 
interacted with monthly dummy variables such that the estimated MWTP for each of 
these climatic characteristics is month-specific. These hedonic price equations are 
estimated separately for each region of origin of tourists following the literature on 
the recreational demand using hedonic price to value site-specific amenities, see in 
particular Brown and Mendelsohn (1984). The dependent variable in these 
equations is the sum of two components: the travel cost between each origin and 
destination region (estimated using the TRANS-TOOLS model) and the monthly 
average price of a standard hotel bedroom, taken from a database provided by the 
online booking company hotelscombined covering 53211 hotels across 233 EU 
NUTS2 regions (including Swiss and Croatian regions)28. 
Considering that holiday stays may vary in length, four different values of the 
dependent variables are calculated according to the length of holiday stays, thus 
considering alternatively one-night, four-night, one-week and two-week stays. The 
average of the estimated hedonic prices and estimated MWTP for climatic services 
are then calculated for each region of destination, region of origin and length of stay.  
In a second step these estimated MWTP are averaged across regions of destination 
using weighted average where the weights are given by the bilateral regional 
tourists' flows. In a third step the tourists demand equation are estimated for each 
                                                        
26 The estimation of transport cost is based on the TRANS-TOOLS model, 
http://energy.jrc.ec.europa.eu/transtools/.  
27 The cost of accommodation is based on a highly detailed database on hotel prices at regional level, over 
50,000 hotels in 233 EU NUTS2 regions. 
28 www.hotelscombined.com. The hotel price indices were constructed in order to ensure geographical 
representativeness at metropolitan (i.e. NUTS3) level. 
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region of destination using the total number of monthly bednights as dependent 
variable and the monthly hedonic price of holiday estimated previously. The average 
population of the origin region is added as control variable to reflect the size of the 
potential tourism demand (using weighted average based on bilateral tourism flows 
and 2010 data on tourist´s expenditures from EUROSTAT). These equations are 
estimated using monthly data and the estimated coefficients are used to make the 
long run projection according to four different climate model runs. The estimated 
propensity to pay for each specific climatic variable are used to extrapolate the value 
of the climatic variables. The latter means that the long-term projections of tourism 
demand are performed as if current conditions other than climate prevailed. 
The tourism model computes then how much tourism expenditure will change due 
to climate change. This is an indicator of the expected impact of climate change on 
tourism demand translated into expected variation in tourists´ expenditures (and 
thus expected revenue loss for the tourism industry). 
Table 23 represents the simulated effects of climate change on tourism expenditure. 
It is assumed that there is full adaptation in both the duration and monthly 
distribution of holidays. The changes in the Reference and 2°C simulations are quite 
similar, compared to the control simulation, with a drop of €15 billion/year. In 
Southern Europe there is an estimated loss of €6 billion/year under the Reference 
simulation (similar to that under the 2°C simulation), a loss of €4 billion/year in 
Central Europe North and a loss of €5 billion/year in Central Europe South. In the 
UK & Ireland region, there is a simulated gain of €0.5 billion/year under the 
Reference simulation.  
Table 23. Impact on tourism expenditure  
 
EU Northern Europe 
UK & 
Ireland 
Central 
Europe 
North 
Central 
Europe 
South 
Southern 
Europe 
Control 334,810 30,882 46,626 109,440 89,101 58,762 
Reference 318,889 30,642 47,040 105,355 83,462 52,389 
 change (%) -5 -1 1 -4 -6 -11 
2°C 319,639 30,702 46,771 105,349 84,303 52,514 
 change (%) -5 -1 0 -4 -5 -11 
Units: million Euro/year 
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4.10 Habitat suitability 
The habitat suitability (HS) of forest tree species study has been implemented using 
the Relative Distance Similarity-Maximum Habitat Suitability method (RDS-MHS [de 
Rigo et al. 2013a]). The RDS-MHS method is based on the Semantic Array 
Programming paradigm (de Rigo, 2012a; 2012b) applied to geospatial European-
wide data on tree species distribution (from the European Forest Data Centre, 
EFDAC: National Forest Inventories and BioSoil data [Durrant et al., 2011]), high-
resolution bioclimatic factors (WorldClim [Hijmans et al., 2005]) and geographic 
ones (topography from SRTM [Farr et al., 2007]) and solar irradiation [Hofierka et 
al., 2007]). Bioclimatic projections have been disaggregated at high-resolution (1 
km2) with the change factor method (Tabor and Williams, 2010; Klausmeyer and 
Shaw, 2009) based on WorldClim current baseline and the future climate scenarios 
referring to the period 2069-2099 (A1B: KRE, MHH, DHE; E1: ME4, see Table 2 and 
Table 3).  
Geospatial semantic array programming (GeoSemAP, de Rigo et al., 2013b) has been 
applied to estimate European-wide current and future geo-climatic similarity to the 
local conditions observed for the available field data of a reference tree species 
(European silver fir - Abies alba29). The similarity has been computed with the 
Mastrave RDS method (widely applied in different environmental problems, de Rigo 
et al., 2013c; Bosco et al., 2013a; 2013b). Areas with high dissimilarity from the 
currently observed geo-climatic conditions of forest field-data have been identified. 
Future climate scenarios predict large areas of Europe to possibly shift toward geo-
climatic patterns which are far from any currently observed pattern in Europe. This 
wide shift introduces an intrinsic source of modelling uncertainty due to climate-
driven extrapolation. Statistical resampling has been applied in order for the overall 
uncertainty of RDS-MHS estimates to be assessed with a robust ensemble approach 
(designed to address multiple sources of uncertainty in environmental problems, 
e.g. see [Rodriguez-Aseretto et al., 2013; de Rigo et al., 2013d; Di Leo et al., 2013]). 
                                                        
29 Abies alba was selected because the plant is considered a good environmental indicator. In addition 
Abies alba is important for pulpwood and construction use in Europe. The population and distribution of 
Abies alba is stable and there is no evidence suggesting continuous decline. Nevertheless, major threats of 
this species are pollution and climate change. Furthermore it is included as a threatened species (least 
concern) in the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List. 
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The most salient finding of this study is a shift towards northern and higher 
elevation areas of potential future habitat of Abies alba under scenario A1B in 2080s. 
Figure 14 (B to F) shows the resulting HS maps implemented for Abies alba. The 
maps show HS of Abies alba under current climate, A1B and E1 future scenario 
conditions. In Figure 14 (B to F) HS is represented as a continuous probabilistic 
function with values ranging from 0 to 1 from less suitable to more suitable. Figure 
14-A shows observed presence of Abies alba, Figure 14 B to F shows areas of high HS 
(>= 0.75) of Abies alba under current climate (B) and future scenarios A1B (C to E) 
and E1 (F). A shift in high suitable areas towards Northern regions is evident in the 
A1B scenario maps (Figure 14 C to E). New suitable areas are in the Scandinavian 
Peninsula, Poland, Northern British Islands and Ireland. Differences between 
different realisations of the scenario A1B are also evident in these figures, 
something that should be considered in assessing the uncertainty of using specific 
models simulations instead of ensemble data. Differences between current HS and 
scenario E1 are less evident. However, new suitable areas are in the Scandinavian 
Peninsula and Northern British Islands and Ireland. In addition to the shift to 
northern regions of suitable areas under the A1B scenario it is also remarkable a 
shrinking of suitable areas in mountain regions such as the Pyrenees, Alps and 
Carpathian. This is consistent with an upslope shift towards higher elevation. 
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Figure 14. Abies alba observed presence (A) and areas of high habitat suitability (>= 0.75) 
under current climate (B) and future scenarios A1B: KRE, MHH and DHE models (C, D and E) 
and E1: ME4 model (F). Source: JRC - EFDAC in the framework of JRC PESETA-II project 
 
Results of this study are subject to a number of limitations and assumptions 
adopted. First, HS defines the regions where tree species actually or potentially lives. 
Therefore areas exhibiting high values of HS will likely host individuals of the 
species. However, several factors could make that the species is not present in 
suitable areas e.g. competition between species, anthropic land cover changes and 
disturbances. Hence, HS should not be understood as the actual current (or future) 
distribution of species. Second, migration of tree species is not considered in our 
modelling approach. Spatial shifts of HS as consequence of anthropogenic climate 
change can overpass natural dispersal capability of tree species, thus increasing 
extinction risk. Finally, interactions between tree species are not considered in the 
computation of HS.  
An HS index was computed from the HS maps shown in Figure 14. The HS index is 
defined according to the percentage of land surface in each range (five classes) of 
HS. The scope of this assessment is measuring changes in the magnitude of HS 
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between the control period and future scenarios. The index represents a balance 
between new, lost and stable suitable areas. HS describes the potential habitat of 
forest tree species across the landscape, thus HS is represented as a continuous 
variable (from 0% to 100%) in the geographical space. Low scores are associated 
with geo-climatic conditions outside the observed range of survivability of the 
reference species, in this case Abies alba. It is worth mentioning that the index of HS 
is a synthetic index that should be assessed carefully because it may hinder relevant 
local level shifts of HS due to the final aggregation in the macro regions in which 
local losses and gains (and consequent local impacts) might cancel each other out. 
Furthermore, even if all new suitable areas are considered positively, they can be 
colonized by the species only assuming infinite migration capacity or man-made 
seeding. Thus the effects of climatic changes on the distribution of the species under 
natural migration could be larger than as depicted in the index. Therefore, the 
proposed index is very conservative in assessing climate change impacts. From an 
ecological perspective, both HS gains and losses may cause negative effects to forest 
ecosystems. 
Table 24 shows the habitat suitability index for Abies alba (silver fir). Over the whole 
EU the suitability index would increase by 5% under the Reference simulation. The 
Northern Europe region is the one with the highest increase (by 25%). In the two 
regions in the south of Europe (Central Europe South and Southern Europe) the 
model projects a slight fall in the suitability index. The EU change in the index is 
similar in the 2°C simulation, while the regional pattern has a bigger gain in the UK 
& Ireland region. 
Table 24. Impact on habitat suitability index (Abies alba)  
 
EU Northern Europe 
UK & 
Ireland 
Central 
Europe 
North 
Central 
Europe 
South 
Southern 
Europe 
Control 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Reference 105 125 108 103 98 95 
 change (%) 5 25 8 3 -2 -5 
2°C 104 124 123 99 106 92 
 change (%) 4 24 23 -1 6 -8 
Units: index = 100 in control period 
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Those large-scale results are reasonably in line with a closer look of HS at local level, 
where a shift of Abies alba HS towards northern regions and higher elevation is 
suggested under future climate scenarios. The shifts are more relevant in Reference 
than 2°C. Although the HS index is useful for representing a summarised overview of 
the situation in the whole European domain, some limitations should be considered. 
First, the index assumes infinite dispersal capacity of Abies alba so that new suitable 
areas compensate lost suitable areas even where their distance exceed the velocity 
of natural propagation. Decreasing HS, or disappearing areas of HS, are in reality not 
necessarily compensated by gains of HS in other areas. In fact our model provides 
potential suitable habitats and should not be interpreted as actual changes in the 
distribution of Abies alba. Natural dispersion is a very slow process (centuries) and 
could be limited by several factors such as the presence of agricultural areas, the 
competition with other dominant tree species which might produce outperforming 
growth and dispersion, presence of forest plantations (in which actually the future 
HS gain of a currently unsuitable species might impact as the introduction of an 
invasive species), etc. Second, the forest ecosystem damage resulting from species 
loss is not accounted in the index. In addition, the migration of species into new 
habitats could be problematic regarding species interactions in no-analogue 
communities (Urban et al., 2012). Having these limitations in mind, it is suggested 
that the assessment of HS is considered also on the light of spatial changes at local 
level and shifts as reported in de Rigo et al. (2013a). Therefore, from an ecological 
perspective, both HS gains and losses may cause negative effects to forest 
ecosystems. 
4.11 Human health 
The assessment of human health impacts (Paci, 2014) follows a similar methodology 
to that of the PESETA project (Watkiss and Hunt, 2012). Empirical exposure-
response functions are used to relate changes in climate variables to mortality and 
morbidity change estimates. These relationships include acclimatisation, but they do 
not include any other form of adaptation (e.g. awareness campaigns, heat waves 
early warning systems, etc.), which could contribute to reduce the negative impact 
of climate change on health. The current population density (divided into three age 
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groups) across Europe is taken into account and assumed to be constant in the 
future. The analysis relies on data at NUTS2 level. 
Heat-related mortality and morbidity (due to cardiovascular and respiratory causes) 
and due to heatwaves (additional heat stress) are considered in the assessment. The 
evaluation includes also projection of morbidity due to food and water-borne 
diseases (salmonellosis and campylobacteriosis). Human health impacts of cold-
related and reduced extreme cold days are not included in the assessment. The 
economic costs of the projected health impacts are calculated using multiple 
techniques to account for direct healthcare costs; productivity losses and the value 
of lives lost and years lost due to premature death.  
Mortality projections due to heat stress and heatwaves provide a main indicator of 
how much climate change can affect human health.  
Table 25 represents the estimated levels of mortality due to heat-related events per 
year (by the end of the century) in the various scenarios. Under the Reference 
simulation, this type of mortality more than doubles compared to the control 
simulation: change in climate condition is thus calculated to be responsible for more 
than 100,000 additional deaths per year at EU level. Most of the increase is 
simulated to happen in Central and Southern Europe, where the mortality doubles 
or more than doubles. The increase in mortality in the remaining two regions is 
much smaller, both in absolute and relative terms. 
The 2°C simulation change in mortality is smaller than the Reference changes. The 
EU mortality increases by 79%, and more than one third of the absolute EU increase 
in climate-related deaths is simulated to occur in the Central Europe South region. 
Compared to the Reference scenario, Southern Europe is simulated to have a much 
lower increase in mortality, passing from 22,000 to 14,000 additional deaths 
attributable to climate change. 
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Table 25. Impact on mortality due to heat-related events 
 
EU Northern Europe 
UK & 
Ireland 
Central 
Europe 
North 
Central 
Europe 
South 
Southern 
Europe 
Control 98,968 6,412 13,127 30,911 26,861 21,657 
Reference 200,507 8,825 18,299 60,411 69,484 43,489 
 change (%) 103 38 39 95 159 101 
2°C 177,178 8,040 16,039 55,915 61,428 35,756 
 change (%) 79 25 22 81 129 65 
Units: deaths/year 
The results confirm to a large extent the results of earlier assessments (in particular, 
those from the PESETA and ClimateCost projects), although with slightly higher 
impacts (both in physical and economic terms). The reduction of mortality induced 
by cold is not included here unlike previous studies, which partly explains the 
overall higher mortality. Some important changes like the inclusion of more impacts 
(mainly heat wave stress on mortality and morbidity, and campylobacteriosis) and 
the exposure-response functions at the regional level (NUTS2) could add to the 
difference in the results. 
The following points summarise the main limitations of the assessment:  
• Because of data constraints, maximum temperature is used as the relevant 
climate variable. This is consistent with the exposure-response functions 
used in the model, however, the use of a thermal comfort index (e.g. Wet Bulb 
Globe Temperature or Discomfort Index), could have led to more accurate 
predictions and would have allowed to a more complete assessment of health 
impacts on labor productivity. 
• The exposure-response functions are assumed to be linear and constant over 
time, except for the thresholds which varies in order to include 
acclimatisation. 
• Socio-economic changes are exogenous in the model: no interaction between 
health and population in the different scenarios is accounted for.  
Some of the climate change effects on human health have not been modelled and this 
may have an impact in the final results. The health impact of extreme events, except 
heat waves, is not estimated. Sea floods and river floods and other climate-change 
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related natural disaster may have a significant impact on health which is not 
included in current results. 
The model does not capture the impact of change in air quality due to climate 
change. For instance, tropospheric ozone concentration is known to increase with 
temperature and could result in higher mortality and morbidity projections. 
4.12 Dynamic linkages land-water-energy 
While the results presented in this report are based on a comparative static analysis 
(e.g.: exploring how energy demand would change in today's economy, but with 
future climate), a preliminary dynamic assessment was carried out to evaluate the 
potential for linking models for future impact assessments. The exercise focused on 
the impact of climate change on energy production and involved the coupling of the 
energy model POLES, the hydrological model LISFLOOD and the Land Use Modelling 
Platform LUMP30. For the sake of simplicity other linkages between energy and the 
rest of the economy (as included in the CGE analysis reported elsewhere in this 
document) were not included. 
The dynamic assessment (Dowling, 2013) was performed considering several 
climatic factors affecting energy production. First, changes in demand for heating 
and cooling were modelled with POLES based on the changes in degree days 
computed from the climate simulations. Second, changes in energy production from 
hydropower were computed by POLES based on the climate-driven changes in 
hydrological regimes at hydropower stations as computed using outputs from the 
LISFLOOD model. The analysis also considered the effects of climate change on the 
efficiency of thermal power plants and changes in hydro, wind (both on- and off-
shore) and solar PV electricity output. These energy impacts can however be 
considered steady-state impacts because they exclude extreme, short-lived impacts 
that cannot be captured because of both lack of climate data and incompatibility 
with the POLES energy model. 
                                                        
30 http://ies.jrc.ec.europa.eu/our-activities/scientific-achievements/Land-Use-Modelling-Platform.html 
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The possible impact of the climate scenarios on future hydropower potential was 
done by assessing the evolution of predicted river discharges in 1387 hydropower 
stations31 for the whole of Europe (including non EU member states). 
Average annual discharge values were modelled in LISFLOOD for the period 2000-
2050 for each climate scenarios and were summed per country and per hydropower 
plant type (run-of-river/hydro or pumped storage). These values have been than 
used in POLES. The computed changes in discharge are shown in Figure 15 for the 
averaged A1B scenario and the 2°C scenario. Number and capacity of stations have 
been assumed to remain constant over time. 
Figure 15. Average annual change in river discharge for run-of-river stations, based on the 
average station discharge per country over the period 2000 - 2050 
   
Note: The average of the values derived from the A1B scenario simulations (left) are 
compared to those from the 2°C scenario (right). Countries which are shown as 
being undefined in the figures lacked sufficient data to compute the factor (i.e. had 
an insufficient number of hydropower stations). 
The results, as reported by Dowling, 2013 (Figure 16) suggests that the impacts of 
precipitation changes on hydropower in the EU are an order of magnitude less 
important than other climate related impacts such as temperature for what 
concerns heating and cooling demand and power plant outputs. 
                                                        
31 Locations are reported in the Major Industrial Plant Database (IHS) and the World Electric Power Plants 
Database (PLATTS).  
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Figure 16. EU27 total electricity production from hydro, per scenario (TWh) 
 
Source: Dowling (2013) 
Additionally, land use changes driven by future population structure and economic 
outlook, as depicted for specific climate scenarios have been analysed using the 
European Land Use Modelling Platform32. A linkage was developed between LUMP 
and POLES to include biomass supply in the evaluation of future energy shares. 
Projected land use/cover classes for urban, natural and semi-natural, forest, 
agricultural and water areas were modelled by LUMP taking into account both static 
and dynamic factors in order to model investments and natural succession 
processes. Employment, population and GDP figures driving LUMP are coming from 
the A1B scenario to guarantee internal consistency in the simulations. Climate 
impacts are included in LUMP via these variables since for this experiment climate is 
not considered for land-use allocations and can therefore be considered a 'no 
climate change' baseline. The land use changes for the period 2010-2030, as 
produced by LUMP, are synthetized in Figure 17.  
                                                        
32 http://ies.jrc.ec.europa.eu/our-activities/scientific-achievements/Land-Use-Modelling-Platform.html 
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Figure 17.Gains and losses of aggregated land-use classes, at European level and under the 
A1B Scenario 
 
Note: NECR=New Energy Crops, SNV=Semi-natural Vegetation. 
Three land uses (namely: forest land, arable land and permanent crops) can provide 
biomass availability for use in the energy sector. Changes in biomass supply are 
translated into changes in biomass prices via the POLES-endogenous biomass cost 
curves. 
For the exercise performed in PESETA II, the changes in biomass land area (as 
produced by LUMP) have been considered to retrieve the biomass cost-curves in 
POLES for the scenario A1B, and then extrapolated to other scenarios. The changes 
in the EU energy mixing, as produced by POLES is below reported. 
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Figure 18.Change in EU27 total electricity generation by source in 2050, per climate change 
scenario compared to no climate change scenarios 
 
Source: Dowling (2013). 
As observed by Dowling (2013), the climate impacts on thermal and nuclear power 
generation, where increased cooling requirements lead to lower efficiencies, is the 
main driver of these results. The climatic impact on renewables is relatively minor 
and due the less competitive thermal and nuclear power generation, rather than due 
to increased renewable supply from climate change. 
The analysis has focused on the implementation of the A1B scenario and aimed to 
test the feasibility and the interconnections between the macro-economic and the 
bio-physical models. Eventually this should evolve towards a fully integrated 
dynamic system, which is aimed to be accomplished in the next phases of the 
PESETA work at the JRC. 
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5 Economic impact: methodology and results 
The previous section has compared the various direct or biophysical impacts across 
climate simulations and EU regions. Different impacts have different metrics and can 
be considered in their own right, without necessarily having to monetise them33. In 
this section, most of the sectoral direct impacts34 are integrated into the computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) economic model GEM-E3 in order to make them 
comparable under a common economic framework (Ciscar et al. 2014). Previous 
studies have made a similar integration of biophysical climate impacts into a CGE 
model; recent references are e.g. Bosello et al. (2012) and Reilly et al. (2013)35. 
The CGE framework is relevant as it provides a mean of assessing the relative 
economic importance of a number of different heterogeneous direct impacts (for 
example, allowing to compare the relative importance of a 2% increase in tourism 
expenditure and a 3% fall in crop yields).  
5.1 Economic integration methodology: multi-sectoral general 
equilibrium analysis 
The CGE analysis allows accounting for a broader set of impacts, beyond the direct 
effects. Indeed, the direct impacts, as studied in the previous section, only take into 
account the effects within the market where the impacts are occurring. For instance, 
in the case of the agriculture model the change in yields (in terms of tons per 
hectare), as computed from the agriculture biophysical model, only consider the 
effects within the agriculture markets and within the country. 
Two other categories of indirect effects are relevant: cross-sectoral and cross-
country. Firstly, the cross-sectoral impacts are effects on other economic sectors or 
markets of the economy that are linked with the sector upon which the shock is 
imposed on (in the case of the previous example, the agriculture sector) via 
commercial relations. One of those sectors can be for instance the agri-food industry 
                                                        
33 They could be introduced in a more elaborate multi-criteria assessment of climate change impacts, 
which is however outside the scope of this report. 
34 This section considers only the impacts for which economic analysis was undertaken. Therefore 
droughts and habitat suitability are not included. 
35 For a review of the literature see Vivid Economics (2013). 
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sector, whose main input comes from the agriculture sector, i.e. purchases of 
agriculture goods, which the agri-food industry transform to produce elaborated 
products.  
Secondly, there are also indirect effects in other economies due to the trade flows 
between countries (both imports and exports). For instance, if one country faces a 
large negative shock, its production level will fall, which will lead to less imports 
from other economies. This kind of analysis is applied to the assessment of the size 
of the possible transboundary or cross-country climate impacts within Europe (see 
subsection 5.6).  
Both categories of indirect effects can be computed with a CGE model36. Therefore, 
the direct effects are integrated into an economic CGE model, yielding total impacts, 
composed of the direct and indirect effects. The use of a multi-sector, multi-country 
general equilibrium model such as GEM-E3 permits that the estimated economic 
impacts include both the direct impact of climate change (e.g. the losses in the 
agriculture sector due to lower yields) and the indirect consequences in the rest of 
the sectors (e.g. in the agrofood industry) and the rest of the EU (considered via 
trade flows). This kind of general equilibrium effects are explored in this section.  
The GEM-E3 model37 is used to compute the overall economic impacts of climate 
change (see Annex II for further details on the model). The model uses a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) approach that allows exploring not only the direct effects, 
but also the indirect, economy-wide economic impact, taking into account cross-
sectoral feedback mechanisms. 
The GEM-E3 CGE model analyses the interactions between the economy, the energy 
system and the environment. The current EU version is based on EUROSTAT data 
(base year 2005), with most member states individually modelled. The countries are 
linked through endogenous bilateral trade flows. The GEM-E3 model integrates 
micro-economic behaviour into a macro-economic framework and allows the 
assessment of medium to long-term implications for policies.  
                                                        
36 The CGE methodology allows to consider many other mechanisms at play in an economy, such as factor 
substitution and the adjustments in the labour and capital markets. 
37 Capros et al. (2013). Visit also www.gem-e3.net. 
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It should also be noted that while EU countries are affected by climate change in the 
modelling setup, it is assumed that the rest of the world is not. Moreover, as 
explained in subsection 2.2, a comparative static analysis is implemented, shocking 
the current economy with future climate changes. 
5.2 Implementation of the climate shocks into the economic model 
The various impact categories are integrated by changing specific elements of the 
GEM-E3 model depending on the effect of climate impact on the real economy. In 
particular, changes have been made to the production structure of the firms, the 
supply of capital, labour and technological progress as well as to the structure of 
household consumption and bilateral trade preferences of certain sectors. Table 26 
summarizes how the different impact categories have been interpreted and 
implemented in the GEM-E3 model38.  
Agriculture, river flood and coastal impacts have been integrated in the same way as 
in the PESETA project (Ciscar et al. 2012b). First, the agriculture model produces 
estimates of agriculture yields, implemented in the model as changes in productivity 
in the agriculture sector39. Second, the effects due to river floods have two main 
components: damages to residential buildings and damages to production sectors. 
The former component is interpreted as an additional obliged consumption of 
households, which leads to a welfare loss40. The latter component has been 
implemented in the model as a capital loss. Third, coastal impacts have also two 
main damage categories. Sea flood damages are interpreted as capital losses. The 
migration costs are modelled as a change in obliged consumption, leading to a 
welfare loss. When people migrate, they undergo certain migration costs, which 
reduce the consumption possibilities of the households. In other words, maintaining 
the same level of welfare will now require additional spending due to migration 
costs. 
                                                        
38 A similar methodology was followed in the PESETA project (see Ciscar et al., 2012b). 
39 The model has a unique agriculture sector, so there is no distinction across crops. The price of the 
agriculture good changes as a response to the productivity change. 
40 Due to the fact that there is now less money available for the (non-obliged) consumption of (other) 
goods. 
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Fourth, heating and cooling demand changes are modelled as changes in residential 
and service sectors energy demand. A fifth impact category relates to transport 
infrastructure. Additional costs for road asphalt (due to heat stress) and bridge 
scour (due to river flows) are modelled as additional obliged consumption, 
implicitly assuming that the households would ultimately undergo those costs. All 
other damages to transport infrastructure, associated with extreme floods and 
winter conditions, are interpreted as capital losses in GEM-E3, because they can be 
interpreted as affecting firms (the capital stock of the economy). A sixth impact 
category deals with forest fires: the burned area damages are implemented as 
capital losses41 and the restoration costs as obliged consumption of households. 
Seventh, tourism impacts are modelled in terms of trade shocks (change in imports 
and a shift in origin countries) to the sectors involved in tourism activities (market 
services and non-market services)42.  
Finally, regarding human health impacts, four kinds of effects are considered. The 
first effect is a change in labour productivity (associated with warmer 
temperatures) which leads at first to lower productivity in the sectors with 
predominant outdoor activity, i.e. agriculture and construction. This approach is 
based on the relationship between WBGT (a combined measure of heat and 
humidity exposure) and labour productivity (Kovats and Lloyd, 2011). The baseline 
regional Wet Bulb Globe Temperature (WBGT) index has been adapted to the 
increase in average mean temperature in the region according to the climate 
simulation, from which then a change in labour productivity has been computed.  
A second effect is the increase in household health system expenditures due to 
morbidity, which is imposed on households as additional obliged consumption that 
does not lead to an increase in welfare due to increased consumption volumes. The 
third effect is the reduction in total available hours (working and leisure hours) due 
to both morbidity and mortality of the working age population. The fourth effect is a 
typical non-market impact due to mortality, which does not affect the price system, 
                                                        
41 The capital loss is allocated to the agriculture-&-forestry sector of the economy. The primary factor 
values from the GTAP database were used to calculate the contribution of the forest "natural resource" to 
this sector. 
42 The changes of tourism expenditure by destination country are introduced into the model by changing 
the share parameters of the Armington specification for trade. These parameters affect the share of goods 
that is produced domestically, the share that is imported and the origin of the imports. 
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and therefore does not affect the general equilibrium of the model. The number of 
premature deaths is considered as damage to the total welfare of the population. 
This damage is calculated by using the statistical value of life method. Therefore the 
overall welfare loss is the number of premature deaths times the value of statistical 
life (VSL). That is an ex-post43 change in welfare level. The VSL has been assumed to 
be €1.09 million (same value for all member states), the low-end of the range of 
estimates considered in the recent review of the European Clean Air Policy Package 
(European Commission, 2013b). The assumed value is lower than the low-end of the 
range for the EU found in the meta-analysis of the literature made by OECD (2012)44.  
                                                        
43 Ex-post in the sense that it is not introduced into the CGE model. It is a change of the welfare level made 
once the model has been run. 
44 For EU-27 the base range for the average VSL is $1.8–5.4 million ($2005), with a base value of $3.6 
million. 
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Table 26 Implementation of sectoral climate impacts in GEM-E3 
Impact Biophysical model output Model implementation 
Agriculture Yield  Productivity change for crops 
Energy Heating and cooling demand  Energy demand changes in residential and service sectors 
Residential buildings damages Additional obliged consumption 
River floods Production activities losses Capital loss 
Burnt area Capital loss 
Forest Fires Reconstruction costs Additional obliged consumption 
Changes in cost of road asphalt 
binder application and bridge 
scouring 
Additional obliged consumption 
Transport 
infrastructure Net change in costs related to 
extreme flooding and winter 
conditions 
Capital loss45 
Migration cost Additional obliged consumption 
Coastal areas Sea floods cost Capital loss 
Tourism Tourism expenditure 
Changes in destination and tourism 
expenditure by bilateral import 
preferences  
Hours lost due to Morbidity 
and mortality Change in labour supply 
Additional health expenditures 
(morbidity)
Additional obliged consumption of 
health services 
Warmer temperature Labour productivity change in agriculture and construction sectors 
Human health 
Mortality Welfare loss (ex-post) 
 
5.3 Impacts on GDP and welfare 
This section presents the main economic results of the integrated modelling 
exercise46, comparing the range of climate impacts for the European economy of 
2010 with and without the expected climate change of the 2071-2100 period (a 30-
                                                        
45 Capital loss can be negative when combined changes in winter conditions and extreme flooding create 
conditions that are more benign than the baseline. 
46 The results here presented are very similar to those published in the Impact Assessment, with the 
exception of transport infrastructure, which have been revised. 
 101 
 
year average)47. Two main metrics of economic results are considered: effects on 
household welfare and Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  
Welfare is obtained by consumers when they choose to spend their time either on 
working (in order to earn income for the purchase of goods and services) or on not 
working (thereby "consuming" leisure). Consumers have a total endowment of time 
which they distribute between these two possibilities depending on their 
preferences and incomes, the value of their labour (the real wage), and the prices of 
goods and services. It is assumed that each consumer must consume a subsistence 
amount of each good (including leisure) which does not contribute towards welfare 
(obliged consumption and obliged leisure). Therefore welfare is derived from 
consumption of goods, services and leisure above the subsistence level. Change in 
welfare in monetary terms is calculated using the concept of equivalent variation. 
This measures the cost (at constant baseline prices) of restoring households’ 
baseline welfare levels once climate changes have occurred. The welfare changes are 
reported relative to GDP in order to compare results across regions. 
GDP is a measure of the value of production of the economy, and it is interesting to 
report also the climate impacts in that dimension or metrics. The GDP change 
provides an indication of the adjustment made in the supply side of the economy 
due to the consequences of climate change in different parts of the economic system. 
Climate change can affect the supply side of the economy (e.g. productivity of 
agriculture or capital losses due to river floods) and the demand of goods and 
services (the cooling demand of households). 
GDP and welfare impacts are provided in monetary terms, are presented 
undiscounted (in 2005 Euros), and are on an annual basis. It is important to recall 
that they are one-off impacts and cannot be interpreted as impacts affecting 
economic growth because the economic analysis is in comparative static terms. 
For a CGE analysis the welfare metrics seems more appropriate because the model 
assumes that households are optimizing their utility or welfare level. Changes in 
welfare are therefore closely linked to the level of welfare of the citizens or 
households of the country. On the contrary, in some cases changes in GDP can be 
                                                        
47 In more precise terms, the impacts derived of comparing the future climate scenarios of the 2071-2100 
with the climate of 1961-1990 are computed and imposed on the 2010 economy. 
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positive while implying a loss in welfare. For instance, if there is a damage that is 
restored, it is generating increased expenditure demand and thereby increased 
production in the economy (i.e. GDP) but households are worse off compared to the 
situation without the climate shock. In addition, the opposite effect can result, 
whereby GDP reduces due to an increase in wages and thus deterioration of trade 
competitiveness but at the same time welfare can improve due to a higher 
disposable income for the households. 
Figure 19 presents the range of welfare changes for the eight impact categories48 in 
the Reference and 2°C simulations across the EU as a whole. The vertical axis 
represents welfare changes (in Equivalent Variation (EV) terms) as % of GDP. In 
reading Figure 19 and the following figures, it should be kept in mind that the level 
of uncertainty analysis available for individual sectors is very different. 
Figure 19. EU welfare impacts in Reference and 2°C simulations (EV as % of GDP) 
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Source: Results of JRC PESETA II project 
The net welfare loss is estimated to be 1.8% of GDP under the reference simulation. 
The greatest negative impacts (2/3 of the total) are associated with the damages to 
human health, being mostly due to premature mortality. In this respect, a similar 
result in terms of the dominance of the health impacts over other impact categories 
                                                        
48 Impacts related to habitat suitability and droughts were not considered in the economic CGE analysis.  
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was obtained in the recent review of the European Clean Air Package49. Moreover, 
this also illustrates the fact that ignoring non-market impacts in the economic 
analysis of climate impacts can lead to severe underestimation of the overall climate 
damages. In this assessment only one category of non-market impact has been 
considered (higher premature mortality due to increased temperature and heat 
waves), but it amounts to twice the total of all the market impacts. Therefore it 
becomes essential to include in future analysis other non-market effects, as noted in 
section 8. 
Coastal areas and agriculture have lower relative importance, while river floods, 
forest fires, tourism impacts and damage to transport infrastructure represent a 
small share of the overall damage. The only positive impact is energy — due largely 
to the reduction in heating demand and thus to ability of the households to diverge 
their consumption to other goods and services. Moving to a 2°C simulation would 
reduce the net welfare loss to 1.2 % of GDP, mainly due to the reduction of the 
impacts on human health, coastal areas and agriculture and, to a lesser extent, river 
floods. 
The overall EU climate impacts are disaggregated by EU region in Figure 20 for the 
reference and 2°C simulations. Regarding the reference simulation, in all regions, 
with the exception of Southern Europe, energy impacts are positive. As one moves 
from the North to the South of Europe the welfare losses in terms of GDP become 
much higher, ranging from 0.2% in the Northern Europe region to 3% both in 
Central Europe South and Southern Europe. 
                                                        
49 When implemented, the European Clear Air Package (European Commission, 2013), is estimated to 
avoid 58,000 premature deaths, which can be monetized in resulting in about €40-140 billion. The rest of 
the direct benefits to society include the higher labour productivity of the workforce (€1850 million), 
lower healthcare costs (€650 million), higher agriculture yields (€230 million) and less damage to buildings 
(€120 million), and around 100 000 additional jobs due to increased productivity and competitiveness 
because of fewer workdays lost. 
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Figure 20. Welfare impacts for EU regions in Reference and 2°C simulations (% GDP) 
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Source: Results of JRC PESETA II project 
For the reference simulation, reading from left to right of Figure 20, Northern 
Europe could have welfare gains associated mainly with lower energy expenditure. 
Impacts in human health and coastal areas are the main negative climate impacts, 
while damage to transport infrastructure is relatively less relevant. The negative 
climate impacts in UK & Ireland are due to sea level rise in coastal areas, human 
health and river floods. The negative impacts in the Central Europe North area 
bigger than in the noted regions, and are mainly provoked by human health and sea 
level rise.  
The EU regions in the south of Europe would experience the highest welfare losses 
in relative terms in the reference simulation, reaching almost 3% of GDP. The 
Central Europe South region could register very large impacts due to human health. 
This is associated with the assumption that the economic valuation of life is the 
same for all EU regions and thus relatively higher for Central Europe South in terms 
of income, resulting then in significant economic impacts.  
All other sectoral impacts are comparatively much less important in that region. The 
Southern Europe region impacts appear to be driven mainly by the energy and 
human health effects and, to a lesser extent, by agriculture, coastal damages, forest 
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fires and river floods. The negative impacts become generally smaller under the 2°C 
simulation, with the highest relative fall in the Southern Europe region. 
Figure 21 represents how impacts change in the two variants of the reference 
simulation (variant 1 is warmer than the reference and variant 2 colder, subsection 
3.3). Some specific impact categories experience large changes in damages between 
the variants, e.g. energy in Northern Europe (where cooling demand in variant 1 is 
considerably higher), river floods in the Northern Europe and UK & Ireland regions, 
and human health in most regions. This issue is further explored in a later section 
dealing with uncertainty (section 7). 
Figure 21. Welfare impacts for EU regions in Reference simulation and variants (% GDP) 
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Source: Results of JRC PESETA II project 
Figure 22 shows the GDP effects for the EU. Under the Reference simulation, EU 
losses could reach 1.1% of GDP (compared to the GDP of 2010 in the simulation 
without climate change) mainly because of impacts on coastal areas and, to a lesser 
extent, agriculture and human health. The overall GDP loss is reduced to 0.7% under 
the 2°C simulation. Regarding the regional pattern of the Reference simulation 
impacts, the Central Europe North is the area most affected in terms of GDP losses 
(up to 1.8% of GDP), due to sea level rise. Southern Europe GDP losses are close to 
1.3% of GDP, mainly led by agriculture impacts and decreased outdoor labour 
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productivity. Overall, the activity levels of the agriculture sector due to deterioration 
of both land and labour productivity are heavily affected in Southern Europe, the EU 
region with the highest share of agriculture in the economy. 
Figure 22. GDP impacts (%) 
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Source: Results of JRC PESETA II project 
Regarding human health, the predominant economic effect, among those analysed, is 
the negative impact of increased temperature and humidity on labour productivity 
of outdoor economic activities. This effect is most significant in the Southern 
European region, where temperature rise is the highest (e.g. an increase in summer 
close to 4°C, Table 8).  
In all considered regions, GDP losses become smaller when one moves from the 
reference simulation to the 2°C simulation.  
Recall that when comparing economic damages across sectors, it is essential to 
consider both welfare and GDP, since the choice of metric has a large influence on 
the relative importance of the sectoral damages (as shown by comparing Figure 20 
and Figure 22). In GDP terms, the greatest damages are caused by coastal impacts 
and agriculture while the effect of energy demand and river floods appears 
relatively unimportant. GDP effects are larger in cases where damages are felt by the 
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productive side of the economy. This includes coastal impacts, which are 
implemented in the CGE model as destruction of productive capital, and agriculture, 
where changes in yield are considered as changes in productivity. 
However, in terms of welfare the effects of human health (all over Europe), coasts 
(UK and Ireland, Central Europe North), energy demand (Southern Europe) and 
river floods (UK & Ireland) are among the most important.  
Of the two metrics, welfare is considered to be the most appropriate since the GEM-
E3 model is rooted in neoclassical economics, where households pursue the 
maximisation of their welfare levels. In cases where damage consists primarily of 
compulsory consumption (e.g. river floods, energy50 and health expenditure) the 
welfare effects are much more notable than GDP, since the household is obliged to 
consume goods due to climate change for which it does not gain any additional 
utility or welfare but at the same time reduces the consumption of other goods due 
to the budget constraint. For example, in the case of river floods, households spend 
money repairing the flood damages in the residential buildings, instead of allocating 
that money to other purposes. In the end, the overall level of production and 
demand in the economy remains similar to baseline levels, but the welfare level is 
lower. 
Regarding human health impacts it should be noted that most of the damage in 
welfare terms is due to the non-market component of the analysis, i.e. the valuation 
of premature deaths. That effect is captured by the welfare measure, but not by the 
GDP metrics.  
In GDP terms, the effect of lower outdoor labour productivity predominates. It 
should be taken into consideration that the relative importance of welfare losses 
associated with mortality are higher in the EU regions with relatively lower per 
capita income levels, as the same value of statistical life is applied to all member 
states. However, this does not affect the relative results significantly since these 
regions appear to also have the most significant health impacts, according to the 
biophysical study. 
                                                        
50 In the case of energy, the compulsory consumption consists of a change in the amounts of heating and 
cooling. For the other sectors, compulsory consumption refers to expenditure needed to repair climate 
change damages (e.g. by repairing roads, or moving house in response to flooding). 
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Concerning energy, it can be seen that the fall in welfare is greatest in regions where 
energy demand rises the most (such as in Southern Europe, due to increased cooling 
demand51), thus causing a large increase in compulsory expenditure52, displacing 
consumption for other goods. However, this increase in demand for energy services 
also increases GDP. Therefore, the energy shock is associated with both an increase 
in GDP and a fall in welfare. This effect is mainly driven by the economy's capacity to 
produce its own energy, the levels of imports or exports of other consumption 
goods, and the degree to which domestic industries can benefit or not from (or be 
harmed by) an increased domestic energy demand.  
5.4 Hot spots analysis 
This section identifies the areas where the simulated climate impacts can be more 
severe, in terms of both geographical areas and impact types. Table 27 represents 
the distribution of the overall impact (normalised to 100 = overall EU impact) for 
the two dimensions. The overall EU welfare loss is estimated to be €190 billion. 
With respect to the impact types, negative impacts on human health become the 
most important ones (€122 billion, 64% of the overall impact), followed by those on 
coastal areas (€42 billion, 22% of the overall impact) and agriculture (€18 billion, 
9% of the overall impact).  
Regarding the geographical dimension of impacts, the most affected region is 
Southern Europe (39% of overall damage). In that region, energy damages alone 
account for 15% of the welfare loss experienced in the whole EU, and human health 
14%. The second most affected region is Central Europe South (31% of overall 
damage), where the main impact is due to human health, which contributes to 27% 
of the net EU welfare loss. Central Europe North undergoes 24% of the EU damage 
(19% of the EU welfare loss due to human health and 11% due to coastal areas, 
partly compensated by a positive 10% in energy). In the UK & Ireland region the 
greatest negative impact is human health and sea level rise.  
                                                        
51 As the additional cooling demand is mainly in terms of electricity, it also leads to relatively higher 
primary energy demand because there are transformation loses. 
52 Additional spending on energy in order to maintain the same level of comfort as the control case is 
considered compulsory expenditure. 
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Table 27. Share of climate welfare impacts per category and region in total impact (reference 
simulation) 
Coastal 
Areas
Energy Agriculture
Forest 
Fires
River 
Floods
Tourism Transport
Human 
Health
Sum of 
impacts
Northern Europe -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
UK & Ireland -4 4 -1 0 -2 0 0 -4 -5
Central Europe north -11 10 -2 0 0 -1 0 -19 -24
Central Europe south -3 3 -1 0 -2 -1 0 -27 -31
Southern Europe -2 -15 -5 -1 -1 -1 0 -14 -39
EU -22 4 -9 -1 -4 -2 0 -64 -100  
Source: results of JRC PESETA II project 
Looking at the potential for hotspots due to climate change (highest values in Table 
27), human health appears as the most important impact driver (27% of overall 
damage in Central Europe South, 19% in Central Europe North and 14% in Southern 
Europe). Energy impacts in Southern Europe (15% of the overall EU impact) and the 
coastal impacts in Central Europe North (11% of the overall EU impact) are key 
areas that would also deserve particular attention in order to minimise the adverse 
effects of climate change. Areas that are also potentially relevant for climate change 
adaptation seem to be coastal impacts and agriculture. 
Under the E1 scenario simulation, where global warming is limited to 2°C, total 
welfare damages would fall by €60 billion, reaching €128 billion, compared to €190 
billion in the Reference A1B scenario. In the 2°C scenario, human health impacts are 
the most important impact category, representing 69% of the overall net damage 
(Table 28). This compares to 64% in the reference simulation (Table 27). That 
shows that even under a climate future with lower emissions, human health related 
impacts appear to drive most of damages in Europe, with the Central Europe South 
region remaining the most vulnerable to human health (34% of the EU total net 
damage in the 2°C scenario). The main benefit from E1 scenario compared to the 
reference is the reduction in welfare loss in human health (€34 billion reduction), 
agriculture (€16 billion reduction), and coastal areas (€8 billion reduction). 
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Table 28. Share of climate welfare impacts per category and region in total impact (2°C 
simulation) 
Coastal 
Areas
Energy Agriculture
Forest 
Fires
River 
Floods
Tourism Transport
Human 
Health
Sum of 
impacts
Northern Europe -1 1 1 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
UK & Ireland -5 3 6 0 -3 0 0 -3 -1
Central Europe north -14 9 0 0 0 -1 0 -22 -29
Central Europe south -4 4 -1 0 -1 -1 0 -30 -34
Southern Europe -3 -10 -7 -1 0 -2 0 -12 -35
EU -27 6 -1 -1 -5 -3 0 -69 -100  
Source: results of JRC PESETA II project 
5.5 Adaptation implications in coastal impacts (2080s) 
Public adaptation measures considered in the DIVA coastal impacts model include 
dike building and beach nourishments. The adaptation measures considered in DIVA 
relate to building dikes and beach nourishments. The GEM-E3 model has been run 
for the reference case when there is public adaptation to sea level rise. In that case 
(Table 29) the overall welfare loss in the EU would be reduced from 42 billion Euros 
(under no adaptation) to 1.6 billion (with adaptation). This shows that there is large 
scope to avoid the coastal damage costs incurred in the Reference scenario.  
Table 29. Effects of adaptation in coastal impacts (reference simulation) 
 
No 
Adaptation
Adaptation
Northern Europe -2,485 -43
UK & Ireland -7,616 -181
Central Europe north -21,483 -844
Central Europe south -6,011 -378
Southern Europe -4,659 -132
EU -42,253 -1,577  
Source: results of JRC PESETA II project 
These types of adaptation measures would themselves incur both capital and 
maintenance costs. The DIVA model estimates the total cost of additional beach 
nourishment and dikes for the period 2005-2095 to be €193 billion53, consisting of 
                                                        
53 The €193 billion is calculated in cash terms (€2005) and is additional to the cost of protection needed 
under a No Climate Change scenario. The net present value of this expenditure, using a 5% discount rate, 
comes to €27 billion. 
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average annual expenditure of around €1 billion up to the 2020s, €2 billion in the 
2050s and over €2.5 billion in the 2080s. The DIVA analysis considered only 'hard' 
adaptation measures, though in practice these would need to be considered 
alongside softer measures such as improved building standards or gradual 
relocation of formerly coastal assets towards the end of their useful lives. 
5.6 Adaptation implications in agriculture (2020) 
Climate change is expected to increase EU average crop yields by 2020 (as discussed 
in subsection 4.2), though variation between regions, crop types, and climate 
scenarios is considerable. Under the Reference Variant 1 and Variant 2 versions of 
the A1B SRES scenario54, yield changes per crop of between -70% and +90% are 
expected at NUTS2 level, though variation is lower at EU level (between -37% and 
+20%). As Figure 23 shows, yield changes without adaptation are broadly positive, 
with falls confined mainly to sunflower.  
Economic analysis suggests a change of between -0.3% and +8% in EU agricultural 
income, but with a large regional variation. Small positive impacts are observed in 
total welfare (up to 0.2%). However, it is important to note that this analysis does 
not take into account the impacts of climate change on yields outside the EU, which 
have some influence on agricultural production in the EU. 
Adaptation is capable of increasing yields above baseline55 levels for all crops 
examined (maize, sunflower, rapeseed and wheat) thus having important 
implication for prices and income. It is important to note that in this analysis 
adaptation consists predominantly of changes in growing cycle length and sowing 
date56, which do not require any increase in inputs57. 
                                                        
54 Reference Variant 1 consists of the HADCM3 GCM nested with the HadRM3 RCM. Reference Variant 2 
consists of the ECHAM5 GCM coupled with the HIRHAM5 RCM. This is consistent with the Other Impacts 
classification given in Table 4. 
55 The baseline period is 1993-2007. 
56 In subsection 5.1, costless measures are assumed to be taken up by rational farmers. Therefore they do 
not count as additional adaptation. The CAPRI analysis takes a different approach, deliberately presenting 
the difference between costless adaptation and a (purely hypothetical) scenario where farmers do not 
adapt at all. 
57 Additional irrigation up to 2700 m3/ha is permitted for maize only. 
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Figure 23. Yield changes in climate change scenarios by NUTS2 and EU zones (% change 
relative to baseline) 
a) No-adaptation 
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a) Best-adaptation 
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Notes: 1 = Southern Europe; 2 = Central Europe South; 3 = Central Europe North; 4 = British Isles; and 5 = 
Northern Europe. 
Source: Shrestha et al. 2013 
The CAPRI analysis considered two types of price assumptions in order to estimate 
the economic impacts of the yield changes shown at NUTS2 level in Figure 24. The 
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first assumption is to fix agricultural commodity prices so that they do not respond 
to climate change. In this case, agricultural income increases in most EU regions 
once the effects of adaptation are included, though increases are lower (<5%) in 
most of Southern Europe, particularly in the Variant 2 scenario. The second 
assumption (named "global"), allows world agricultural commodity prices to 
respond to the supply shock created by the climate-induced yield change. This 
causes prices to fall relative to the baseline, and consequently changes in 
agricultural income are generally below 1%. It is important to note that both price 
assumptions are purely hypothetical since the first ignores the effect of yields on 
prices, while the second ignores the effects of yield changes outside the EU58 – which 
could either reinforce or counteract the price effects of EU yield changes. 
Figure 24. Income change at NUTS2 in EU-27 (a) under no-adaptation and (b) under best-
adaptation (% change relative to baseline) 
 
 
a) No-adaptation 
 
b) Best-adaptation 
 
 Source: Shrestha et al. 2013 
                                                        
58 There are no yield effects outside EU due to climate change. There are prices effects outside the EU but 
they are not attributed to a yield-climate effect. It is because of the interaction with the changes in 
production and price in the EU. 
Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 1-global Variant 2-global
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The results at EU level show that for agricultural incomes (Table 30), gains in the 
fixed-price scenario are entirely wiped out once the effect on world prices is taken 
into account, whether farmers adapt or not. This underlines the importance of 
including yield changes outside the EU (and their effects on prices) in future 
economic analysis of climate change and agriculture. 
Table 30. Agriculture income in EU-27 (% change relative to baseline) 
 No Adaptation Best Adaptation 
Variant 1 3.3% 8.0% 
Variant 2 0.8% 6.8% 
Variant 1-global -0.2% -0.1% 
Variant 2-global -0.2% -0.3% 
Source: Shrestha et al. 2013 
The estimated gains in total welfare (which includes gains to consumers) are shown 
in Table 31. These results are obtained by feeding the estimated agriculture yield 
changes into the GEM-E3 CGE model. Welfare gains are in the range of €1.5 to €9 
billion without adaptation (Table 31). With adaptation measures in place the yields 
were improved, leading to welfare gains of around €18-20 billion, mostly in the 
Central Europe regions. 
Table 31. Agriculture 2020 welfare changes without and with adaptation (€ billion) 
 
Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 1 Variant 2
Northern Europe 790 238 1,157 1,126
UK & Ireland 1,484 480 2,145 2,562
Central Europe north 2,983 402 7,541 7,300
Central Europe south 2,277 556 6,228 4,973
Southern Europe 1,469 -107 3,284 1,973
EU 9,003 1,569 20,356 17,934
No Adaptation  Adaptation
 
Source: results of JRC PESETA II project 
5.7 Possible transboundary effects  
An interesting issue to analyse is to what extent climate impacts occurring in one EU 
region could affect the rest of the EU. Intuitively, impacts in one region would affect 
production and welfare elsewhere through trade effects, given the high degree of 
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economic integration between the EU member states. Two simulations with the 
reference setting have been made to explore the role played by these trade effects.  
In the first analysis (first column of Table 32), one can imagine a counterfactual 
situation where sea level rise affects only Central Europe North (the most low-
lowing region, where the impact of sea level rise is expected to be most severe), 
while the rest of the EU regions do not suffer any direct impact. Under such a case, 
the economic modelling results with the GEM-E3 model suggest that Central Europe 
North would have a welfare loss of 20.5 billion Euros. There would be an additional 
30% welfare loss (5.6 billion Euros) in the rest of the EU due to the economic 
linkages between EU regions. 
Table 32. Transboundary effects (reference simulation) 
 
Coast                       
Central Europe North
Agriculture  
Southern Europe
Northern Europe -491 -173
UK & Ireland -1,677 -798
Central Europe north -20,518 -1,380
Central Europe south -1,966 -1,209
Southern Europe -1,530 -14,979
EU -26,181 -18,540  
Source: results of JRC PESETA II project 
A similar simulation regarding agriculture impacts has been made, the hypothetical 
case being that yield change occurs only in the Southern Europe region. In that case 
the impact in Southern Europe could be 15 billion Euros. There would be an 
additional loss of 20% (3.5 billion Euros) in the rest of the EU regions, leading to an 
overall welfare loss estimated at 18.5 billion Euros (second column of Table 32). 
The first results on this respect can indicate that it is not only in the self-interest of 
countries/regions to develop the right adaptation framework, but also in the 
interest of their economic partners. This reinforces the need for coordination and 
cooperation at EU level to ensure an effective level of preparedness across the whole 
EU territory. 
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5.8 Influence of climate model uncertainty 
Uncertainty influences largely the results. In this subsection some insight is 
provided into the influence of the projected climate amongst different RCM 
simulations driven by the same Reference scenario. 
In the river flood assessment, A1B scenario results are available from twelve 
separate climate models. Table 33 shows the welfare impacts for the reference 
simulation and the worst and best cases, where the variability in results is 
exclusively due to a different choice of climate model. The best case is defined as 
that with the lowest EU damage and the worst case the climate simulation with the 
highest EU damage. It is interesting to note the wide variability of impacts. Impacts 
for the whole EU could be four times bigger or half the reference value. The range of 
variation is even larger for the EU regions. For instance, the Central Europe North 
region would have a welfare loss more than ten times bigger in the worst case 
simulation, compared to the reference, while Southern Europe suffers nearly three 
times more in the best case (even though this is the least damaging outcome for the 
EU as a whole). 
Table 33. Welfare impacts of river floods in worst, reference and best cases (€ million) 
Worst case Reference Best case
Northern Europe -493 212 -26
UK & Ireland -13,462 -2,965 110
Central Europe north -3,702 -469 -383
Central Europe south -9,818 -3,210 -57
Southern Europe -4,489 -1,037 -2,603
EU -31,965 -7,469 -2,958  
Source: results of JRC PESETA II project 
Table 34 presents the related GDP changes. The GDP loss could be 0.1% in the worst 
case simulation, being 0.2% in UK & Ireland. 
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Table 34. GDP Impact of river floods in worst, reference and best cases (% GDP) 
Worst case Reference Best case
Northern Europe -0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
UK & Ireland -0.2% 0.0% 0.0%
Central Europe north 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Central Europe south -0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Southern Europe -0.1% 0.0% -0.1%
EU -0.1% 0.0% 0.0%  
Source: results of JRC PESETA II project 
For the energy assessment, temperature and precipitation changes from twelve 
different A1B scenarios are used to estimate demand changes in the POLES model 
which are fed in turn into the GEM-E3 model. The best and worst cases are shown in 
Table 35 and Table 36 in terms of changes in absolute welfare and percentage GDP. 
Table 35. Welfare impacts of energy demand changes in worst, reference and best cases 
(€million) 
Worst Case Reference Best Case
Northern Europe -5,307 2,283 4,678
UK & Ireland -881 8,047 11,327
Central Europe North 7,647 18,771 27,438
Central Europe South -3,074 6,428 14,234
Southern Europe -50,439 -27,524 12,606
EU -52,055 8,004 70,284  
 
Table 36. GDP impact of energy demand changes in worst, reference and best cases (%) 
Worst Case Reference Best Case
Northern Europe -0.2% -0.1% 0.1%
UK & Ireland -0.7% -0.1% 0.1%
Central Europe North -0.2% -0.1% 0.1%
Central Europe South 0.0% 0.1% 0.2%
Southern Europe 0.0% 0.1% 0.2%
EU -1.0% -0.1% 0.7%  
The added value of using a large number of climate simulations59 can be seen more 
clearly in Figure 25, where the welfare and GDP impacts of each A1B shock to 
                                                        
59 Where different climate models (GCMs and RCMs) are fed with the same socioeconomic and emissions 
inputs. 
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energy demand are shown in ascending order. At regional level, there is agreement 
between most of the climate simulations (but not all) as to whether the effect of the 
energy demand shock will be positive or negative. Once spread across the whole EU 
the impacts tend to be smaller, in terms of GDP percentage points. However, at EU 
level there is also less agreement over whether the impact would be positive or 
negative. 
Figure 25. Welfare impact of A1B energy demand changes in ascending order (€ per capita) 
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6 The impacts on Europe of crossing climate tipping points 
Recent research efforts have led to the proposal that additional model-based 
research is needed into climate tipping points. There are events where the response 
of the earth system components (e.g. Greenland ice sheet, West Antarctic ice sheet, 
thermohaline circulation) to climate change may be nonlinear and irreversible 
beyond certain warming level (Huybrecht et al, 2011; Driesschart et al, 2007, 
Goelzer et al, 2011; Robinson et al, 2012). Assessments based on observations and 
paleoclimatic data (Smith et al., 2009), expert elicitation (Lenton et al. 2008, Kriegler 
et al., 2009) or higher temperature projections (Parry et al., 2009) are giving an 
increased prominence to these events.  
An exploratory study attempting to assess the economic impact of nonlinear 
consequences of climate change in Europe was initiated as part of the overall 
PESETA II project. Modelling the economic impact of such abrupt events has been 
difficult60 due to the large uncertainties about probabilities and consequences (US 
CCSP, 2008; Keller et al., 2008, Weitzman 2009). Initiating an economic assessment 
of abrupt changes in the absence of a scientifically-based consensus remains 
exploratory research and it can best be based on a combination of carefully elicited 
expert judgment. With this aim, IPTS organised an expert workshop to discuss 
potential consequences in Europe from crossing selected climate tipping points. 
These nonlinear consequences of climate change are defined using tipping points, 
thresholds above which a small change could cause a major shift in the climate 
system (Lenton et al 2008).  
Levermann et al (2010, 2012) had already assessed the probabilities of the tipping 
points with high expected impact on Europe. After further research and discussions 
with experts, IPTS made a selection of the 5 tipping points mentioned below, in line 
with the assessment produced by Levermann et al (2012). In addition, a more 
speculative (but still plausible) scenario of an increased frequency of persistent 
blocking events over Europe was considered. The final list of the six tipping points 
investigated was as follows: 
• Arctic Sea-Ice melting (ASI) 
                                                        
60 See e.g. Lenton and Ciscar (2013). 
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• Melting of Alpine glaciers (MAG)   
• Greenland Ice sheet meltdown (GIS) 
• West Antarctic ice sheet collapse (WAIS) 
• Collapse of the Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation (THC) 
• Persistent blocking events of the jet stream (BLK) 
Once the potential tipping points had been selected, the next step was to describe 
the global consequences in a time frame short enough to make an economic 
assessment plausible. Since there is no model or sound scientific agreement on 
when (or even "if") these tipping points will be reached and their consequences, 
expert judgement was pursued to produce a credible "best current estimate" of 
scientific knowledge (Keith 1996). The results of the expert judgment exercise are 
presented below. The economic assessment component was not finally made. 
In order to collect expert views, a workshop titled "Impacts on Europe of crossing 
climate tipping points" took place at IPTS on 1 June 2012 with the aim to discuss the 
potential for these selected tipping points being crossed. 
The tipping points to be investigated were each presented by an expert researcher 
in the field. They were asked about the probability and main consequences of 
crossing the selected tipping points. The description of each tipping point selected 
for the study and a summary of the views presented during the workshop combined 
with background research is included below. 
6.1 Arctic Sea-Ice melting (ASI) 
Higher temperatures lower the extent and thickness of Arctic sea ice in turn 
accelerating regional warming and increasing the variability of sea ice cover. The 
record sea-ice minimum extents observed during the summers of 2007 and 2012 
seem to evidence the accelerated sea-ice loss during the last decade (Devasthale et 
al. 2013). According to L.H. Smedsrud (U. of Bergen, Norway), in the RCP 8.5 
scenario, the Norwegian Earth System Model (NorESM) predicts that the summer 
Arctic will be summer ice-free by 2040. 
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According to a number of studies (Cohen et al. 2013) the consequences of ASI 
melting would include colder winters in Europe, which might increase morbidity 
and mortality, although the actual impact of this effect in the context of global 
warming is still very uncertain. A potential southward push of the jet stream will 
shift storm tracks, leaving the south of Europe even drier, affecting agricultural 
production. Gas and oil reservoirs made available by ice melt will eventually alter 
energy market and maritime transport (made possible because of ice retreat). 
Potential methane release from permafrost melting is also a concern (Wadhams, 
2013). 
6.2 Melting of Alpine glaciers (MAG) 
Different model approaches indicate that an increase in global mean air temperature 
of 2 ºC will lead to an almost complete loss of glacier ice volume in the Alps (Zemp et 
al. 2006; Le Meur et al. 2007; Jouvet et al. 2009, Huss 2011). Current projections, 
regardless of the different temperature increase projected for all the RCPs scenarios, 
expect 60% of glacier surface, as compared to 2003, to disappear by 2050 and total 
glacier area to be reduced to 4% (RCP8.5) or 18% (RCP2.6) by 2100 (Huss 2012).  
Prof. Haberli (University of Zurich, Switzerland) attended the IPTS workshop and 
presented an overview of the main impacts expected. Alpine glacier melting will 
only contribute about 0.3 mm SLR (sea level rise) (Haeberli and Hoelzle 1995; 
Haeberli and Linsbauer, 2013), so it is of no importance concerning the global ocean. 
The main impacts will be on the hydrological regime (Huss 2011), especially the 
seasonal patterns of runoff and fresh-water supply. These changes in the 
hydrological regime affect hydropower potential in the area. There will be a 
temporary increase because of the additional water from accelerating glacier melt 
but after a few years or decades hydropower potential will decrease irreversibly 
(even under cooling conditions with positive mass balances) with decreasing glacier 
surface. With the glaciers disappearing, it is anticipated that the year-to-year 
variability in discharge from higher altitudes will approach similar levels to lowland 
basins. Hydropower companies will see production levels affected with longer 
periods with no water. 
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An increasing number of new lakes forming in de-glaciating areas may initially be 
used to compensate for losses (Terrier et al. 2011), but the total volume for all the 
new lakes is only equivalent to about one year’s meltwater runoff under present-day 
conditions. 
Agriculture production might be favored at the beginning, but water stress may later 
on decrease productivity. Inland navigation is mainly influenced by water depth. 
Low river discharges will therefore negatively impact transportation. Present Alpine 
glacier landscapes as a primary attraction will change into new landscapes of 
sparsely vegetation-covered debris and rocks with lakes. There will be more debris 
input into rivers and an increasing frequency of large rock falls – now about 1 event 
with more than 1 million m3 every 4 to 5 years (cf. Fischer et al. 2011). This is 
important for e.g. transportation, construction, road maintenance in high mountains. 
The risk of catastrophic damage from floods as a consequence of impact waves in 
new lakes forming at the foot of large destabilizing icy slopes may appear small now 
but is steadily increasing for long time periods to come. 
6.3 Greenland Ice sheet meltdown (GIS) 
Melting at the glacial margins lowers the edge of an ice sheet to elevations that are 
warmer and where more melting will occur. If the surface mass balance becomes 
negative, the ice sheet will inevitably shrink, and could disappear nearly completely.  
One of the main concerns over GIS, as discussed by Dr. Lowe (Hadley Centre, Met 
Office, UK) is its possible irreversibility. A Met Office Hadley Centre study (Ridley et 
al. 2009) has looked at a partially or completely melted Greenland ice sheet, putting 
melted Greenland (with different % of mass loss) back into a climate model with 
pre-industrial greenhouse gas concentrations. If GIS melts completely, it would only 
recover 25% of its mass at pre-industrial CO2 concentrations.  
While the complete melting of Greenland ice-sheet could take over 3000 years 
(Ridley et al. 2009), a loss of up to 15% of ice volume could occur within 300 years. 
The expected sea level rise from future loss of ice from the Greenland and Antarctic 
ice sheets might occur fast enough during the 21st century to cause significant 
coastal impacts. Future contribution of Greenland to sea level rise is uncertain, but 
several studies try to provide upper bounds based on physical plausibility. A total 
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21st century sea level rise of 2 m cannot be ruled out but current estimates give this 
upper limit an extremely low probability.  
Another consequence of GIS meltdown is its interaction with THC (thermohaline 
circulation). Fresh water from the ice sheet might trigger slowdown of AMOC 
(Atlantic meridional overturning circulation) with impacts on European weather. 
This is described in more detail in subsection 6.5. 
Main impacts for Europe will be caused by changing extremes (increased storm 
surges and changes in tidal characteristics aggravated by SLR (North Sea coastal 
regions will be more affected), inundation of low lying areas, salt water intrusion 
(with consequences for ground water and agriculture), erosion of coastal zones 
(allowing wave energy to propagate further) and loss of wetlands (Mediterranean 
region especially vulnerable). 
6.4 West Antarctic ice sheet (WAIS) collapse  
Most of the WAIS is grounded below sea level on reversed bed slopes, and its 
collapse could raise global sea level (GSL) between 3.3-5 meters (Alley and Whillans 
1991, Bamber et al. 2009, Lythe et al. 2001).  
T. Payne (University of Bristol, UK) discussed this issue at the IPTS workshop. 
Concern about ice sheet melting associated with Antarctic is linked to the possible 
instability of the West Antarctic ice sheet which is mainly resting on ground below 
sea level. While the understanding of physical mechanisms is improved, modelling 
ice sheet grounding line migration is still challenging, notably due to the high spatial 
resolution required (better than 1 km). 
Results of recent modelling experiments were presented in which the process chain 
was simulated from near coastal ocean and air temperature (as projected with 
regional models) to resulting subshelf melt rates and grounding line retreat. Initial 
results based on a 80-member ensemble provide a first indicative probability 
distribution function of contribution to sea level rise by 2100. This suggests a very 
flat, long ill-defined tail distribution with for instance a 68% probability that SLR 
contribution would be lower than 20 cm, but, also a 5% probability for a 1 m SLR. 
The distribution depends on e.g. snowfall intensity which would transfer curve from 
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one side to the other, as this process is in competition with all those leading to 
increased ice-loss and SLR. Sea level rise is very likely to continue beyond 2100 and 
2200. 
6.5 Collapse of the Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation (THC) 
The term “thermohaline circulation” (THC) refers to a key physical driving 
mechanism of the ocean circulation—resulting from fluxes of heat and freshwater 
across the sea surface, and the physical transport of heat and salt by the circulation 
itself – which can give rise to multiple stable states. In the Atlantic, it is manifested in 
the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC), which transports surface 
water northwards across the equator and then via the Gulf Stream and North 
Atlantic Current contributes to the warming of Northern Europe. Deep water forms 
in the North Atlantic and returns southward at depth. Models simulate a weakening 
of the THC in response to surface warming and freshening at high latitudes, and 
some suggest a complete breakdown of the THC under additional fresh water input 
into the North Atlantic. A gradual weakening of the North Atlantic THC by 18-44% is 
expected for 2100 (Schmittner et al. 2005; Weaver et al., 2012).  
A THC collapse would have a global imprint, but the signal would be the largest in 
eastern North Atlantic. European coastal areas would suffer the most. Compared 
with the unforced model simulations, the surface air temperature in the Netherlands 
experiences a rapid decrease (~4ºC). The THC overturning would thus completely 
outweigh the global warming effect expected. 
Northern Hemisphere storm tracks would shift to the south and intensify. Over the 
northern half of Europe, decreased zonal winds and reduced moisture advection 
would cause drying over land, especially in winter. Cloud feedbacks would enhance 
cooling over sea and temperature cooling over land. This precipitation and storm 
track changes (decreased water availability) would cause a decrease in agricultural 
production. 
With THC decrease, the availability of nutrients in North Sea will be affected as a 
consequence of decreased deep water mixing. With fewer nutrients around, 
zooplankton will decrease affecting fisheries. 
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After 20 years of THC collapse, temperature increase would then resume but would 
remain lower compared with the unforced THC projection case. For the next 
century, only few models predict strong response of THC to global warming. The 
range of responses over CMIP5 models is about -20% to -60% THC weakening by 
2100 and -30% to -80% by 2200 in the RCP8.5 scenario.  
6.6 Persistent blocking events of the jet stream (BLK) 
Atmospheric blocking can induce extremely high or low temperatures and severe 
precipitation anomalies over the surrounding area, e.g. the European heat wave of 
2003 (Black et al., 2004), the heavy precipitations in California (Neiman et al., 2004), 
or the intense heat wave over Eastern Europe and Russia in the summer of 2010 
(Matsueda 2011). This blocking consists of a persistent high pressure anomaly that 
displaces northward the mid-latitude jet, hence blocking it from hitting a particular 
region (Xoplaki et al 2011), which tends to appear with a certain frequency in well-
defined regions of the world (D’Andrea et al., 1998; Barriopedro et al., 2010), 
namely over northeastern Atlantic Ocean and Europe, and over the northern Pacific 
Ocean. Europe is considered one the most important regions for blocking because it 
is the only place in the world where a storm track and a jet stream end (Woollings 
2010). 
Identification methods for blocking have been refined and applied for reanalysis in 
CMIP3 and CMIP5 models. These studies point to a robust reduction in blocking 
frequency under global warming, while the duration of the blocking remains nearly 
constant (Barnes et al 2012, Anstey et al 2012). However, there is considerable 
uncertainty since other approaches suggest less agreement between models. For 
example, Masato et al (2012) find little decrease in European summer blocking in 
RCP8.5 by 2100, and even signs of a small increase over Northeast Europe.  
BLK in summer will cause heat waves and droughts on one side and increased 
precipitation on the other. The heat waves will affect agriculture production, in 
addition, if water too scarce or weather too hot, it will be a problem for tourism and 
households (there will be increased mortality and morbidity caused by heat). 
Outside the blocking, higher precipitation will lead to floods. 
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6.7 Worst cases analysis 
Finally, the envisaged individual worst cases associated with the different systems 
susceptible to experience profound changes, with possibly the passing of tipping 
points were discussed at the workshop. Experts agreed on assumptions regarding 
the expected changes and consequences on sea level rise that can be partly 
supported by the above-mentioned research findings. However, the associated 
uncertainty implies inevitable subjective judgement. The workshop held in June 
2012 was meant to frame and define the large scale consequences of passing each 
tipping point and how far they would add to the currently available climate change 
projections (assuming A1B, A2 (or RCP8.5)). As a result of discussions, "worst" case 
scenario(s) for A1B by respectively 2100 was broadly defined, though consensus on 
RCP 8.5 projections was not reached and are not included (Table 37).  
Table 37. Worst impacts expected for each tipping point in A1B climate scenarios 
worst case main 
assumptions
extremely low 
probability 
scenario(*)
Units
SLR Thermal expansion 0.32 m eq-SLR
Glaciers and small ice caps 0.12 m eq-SLR
Tipping points:
Greenland Ice Sheet 0.2 0.54 m eq-SLR
West Antarctic Ice Sheet 0.2 0.62 m eq-SLR
-20% -100% % weakening
0.1 0.1 m regional SLR
Summer Arctic Sea 2025 date for near-complete melting
Alpine Glaciers 2070 date for near-complete melting
20% frequency of summer blocking events (% change)
10% average duration (% change)
1
increase in average temperature during blocking events 
(degree C) to be superimposed to the larger background 
warming
Combined scenario for SLR(**) 0.8 1.6 m eq-SLR
Thermohaline Circulation
Blocking events
A1B - 2100
(**) Thermal expansion + melting glaciers + ice sheet melting
(*) this scenario is considered as a "no regret" scenario
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6.8 Conclusion and possible next steps 
The agreement reached by the experts was however not sufficient for a further 
economic assessment of the consequences, since the biophysical consequences 
could not be defined with sufficient specificity. The expert consensus was 
inconclusive, with the added difficulty in quantifying the impacts. For example, in 
the case of THC, it is difficult to translate changes in temperature into regional 
climate consequences. In the case of BLK, it was also complicated to quantify and to 
obtain a solid enough consensus to further the assessment. Besides, there was even 
a lack of agreement on definition and it proved difficult to finally include it as a 
tipping point. 
As a conclusion, to maximize the value of the results and in view of the impossibility 
to define the biophysical consequences of the scenarios proposed, future research 
efforts could concentrate on the impacts from WAIS and GIS as priority areas with 
an assessment of the consequences on the SLR, before addressing the other tipping 
points. 
Only SLR projections were specific enough to be used in an economic assessment, 
which is planned to be made at a later stage. This economic assessment has already 
been done elsewhere (Brown et al 2011, Nicholls et al 2011) but further efforts to 
more comprehensively assess coastal impacts are needed. For instance, the issue of 
regional deviation from global mean SLR is usually not considered in global 
assessments (Slangen et al. 2012). A current gap on assessing SLR impacts seems to 
be that wave climate, storm surges, winds and currents, river discharge and run-off 
are rarely considered (Losada et al 2013). The main agent considered on climate 
change coastal impact has been sea level rise but it should not be considered alone 
but together with changes in storm surges and extreme events. Predicted rising sea 
levels will lead to increases in inundated areas (Nicholls and Cazenave, 2010) but 
increases in extreme sea levels are a more significant threat. Extreme sea levels are 
the result of several coinciding processes, including astronomical tides and severe 
weather events such as tropical cyclones, which generate elevated coastal sea levels 
through storm surge and high waves (Walsh et al 2012).  
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7 Limitations 
The results of this study should be taken with care, due to the inherent uncertainties 
of the integrated assessment. Uncertainties in impact assessment results are 
accumulated throughout the process of producing climate change projections and 
the subsequent biophysical and economic impact assessments, as a cascading 
pyramid (e.g. Lung et al., 2013). The initial source of uncertainty is due to the 
assumptions on different pathways of anthropogenic emissions and resulting 
atmospheric concentrations, followed by the ability of general circulation models to 
simulate changes in climatic parameters. A second layer of uncertainty is added by 
regional climate models (RCMs). When bias correction is applied, it may cause some 
additional uncertainty. Uncertainty is further increased when using climate 
projections as inputs to impact models that use biophysical and economic data and 
models, which also have their intrinsic uncertainties. The degree of the latter 
uncertainties and the thoroughness by which they are analysed varies from sector to 
sector. Uncertainties related to flood impacts is arguably best documented (e.g. 
Rojas et al. 2013). This analysis has provided an illustration of the variability created 
only by using different climate models and emissions scenarios, but not by using 
different impact models. 
Another limitation comes from the fact that the sectoral biophysical impact models 
are calibrated based on observed data. Yet the projected climate impacts can be 
outside the range of historical observations. This is a major difficulty in any climate 
impact assessment.  
A key issue to bear also in mind is also the limited scope of the JRC PESETA II climate 
impact assessment. The analysis carried out is constrained by the state-of-the-art 
modelling capabilities, given the available data and the quantitative understanding 
of biophysical and economic processes. Several dimensions regarding the limited 
scope should be considered when interpreting the results. Firstly, the impact areas 
of the study do not include all relevant impacts. For instance the effects of 
temperature extremes on agriculture have not been considered, while they can be of 
paramount importance. Schlenker and Roberts (2009) note that yields for soybeans 
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and cotton can be largely negatively affected for temperatures above certain 
thresholds.  
Secondly, several potentially large climate impact categories have not been 
modelled. That is notably the case of all the impacts affecting ecosystems, and 
biodiversity, for which there are not market prices.  
Thirdly, the consequences of abrupt climate change, including climate tipping points, 
have not been either taken into account (National Research Council, 2013). Pricing 
climate risk appropriately becomes a fundamental issue in this respect.  
This impact study offers incomplete estimates of climate damages. From this 
perspective, the assessment severely underestimates the potential damages of 
climate change in Europe. 
Moreover, comparing the welfare impacts in the Reference simulation (or do 
nothing case) with those of the 2°C scenario does not represent a proper analysis of 
the benefits of mitigation or reducing GHG emissions to attain the 2°C scenario. This 
is partly because some of the key omitted impacts mentioned above (such as 
extremes and abrupt climate change) may be more important in the Reference 
simulation compared to the 2°C scenario. In addition, ancillary benefits associated 
with lower EU energy imports and air pollution are not considered. The 2°C scenario 
would lead to a substantial reduction in net energy imports in the EU (compared to 
the Reference simulation), which would reduce the EU energy dependence on fossil 
fuels. This would reduce the macroeconomic vulnerability of the EU economy to 
energy price shocks. The additional benefits due to lower air pollution of the 2°C 
scenario can be also very large and have not been studied. Last but not least, the 
climate impact analysis runs to the year 2100, while impacts occurring later would 
matter in the analysis. In particular, the difference in impacts between the Reference 
simulation and the 2°C scenario would get bigger as time passes beyond 2100. 
Another issue is that the economic impacts refer to a hypothetical, counterfactual 
situation where future climate of the 2080s occurs in today's economy. In this 
respect, the assessment is computing one-off impacts, and not dynamic impacts such 
as changes in the rate of economic growth (Fankhauser and Tol, 2006; Hallegatte, 
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2012). As already noted, the simulated economic impacts (both in welfare and GDP 
terms) represent a level shift or one-off change, and not a change in the growth rate.   
Effects on savings and investments should be included in the analysis to explore the 
impact on economic growth (Stern, 2013). Other potential changes that could affect 
damages in the future include population (more or less population exposed to 
damages) and valuation of impacts that may change with economic growth (e.g. 
higher value of coastal properties).  
Another methodological difficulty relates to the proper modelling of adaptation and 
its economic costs. The state-of-the-art in adaptation cost-benefit analysis is a 
developing field and further research is required in this area to better understand 
how and by how much adaptation options can reduce climate vulnerabilities in 
particular hot spots. 
Finally, the analysis has assumed that the economies of the rest of the world remain 
unchanged in spite of climate change. Yet changes in trade flows and international 
prices due to impacts in the rest of the world would affect Europe. For instance, the 
impacts of climate change on agriculture production can be quite large in some 
world regions, with a substantial influence on agriculture prices world-wide (e.g. 
Hertel et al., 2010). In this respect, for each of the sectoral studies it would be 
interesting to explore how impacts in the EU differ depending on how climate 
change affects the rest of the world.  
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8 Further research 
There are a number of areas that deserve further attention from the research 
perspective, in order to derive useful insights for policymakers. Firstly, there is a 
need both to deepen the analysis of the considered impacts and also to enlarge the 
set of impact categories. The analyses related to climate extremes, and the effects on 
ecosystem services and human health (e.g. Nam et al.,2010), impacts on migration, 
and the effects of passing tipping points (Lenton et al., 2008) become fundamental 
research priorities to better understand what is at stake in terms of benefits of 
climate policy action. 
Secondly, it is necessary to better understand the economics of climate adaptation in 
order to improve the resilience of the economic system. Many current investment 
infrastructures with long time horizons will require the analysis of how climate 
change will affect those investment decisions. Yet the available cost-benefit analysis 
of climate adaptation remains quite limited. 
Thirdly, from a methodological perspective there is a need to further integrate the 
various impacts using horizontal consistent frameworks relating water and land-
use. Another topic is the possibility to derive reduced-form damage functions, which 
could be used in top-down integrated assessment models of climate and the 
economy. 
Fourthly, while most of the PESETA sectoral assessments are made in a static 
context, it is important to move towards a dynamic framework, where impacts on 
economic growth and the land-water-energy nexus can be better assessed61. 
Fifthly, a global sound assessment of climate impacts is also a research priority. 
Understanding better how changes in the climate system could affect the key players 
in international negotiations would help in the design of the appropriate policies to 
address the climate change threat. 
                                                        
61 Those areas are to be covered by the on-going OECD Costs of Inaction and Resource scarcity: 
Consequences for Long-term Economic growth (CIRCLE) project, http://www.oecd.org/env/indicators-
modelling-outlooks/circle.htm  
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Finally, given the broad range of uncertainties involved in the modelling there is a 
clear need to do a systematic stochastic analysis of climate impacts, a task that will 
require close cooperation and integration among the many involved disciplines. 
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Annex I Main climate features of the JRC PESETA II climate 
simulations 
Table 40. Temperature change (°C) in all climate simulations, compared to 1961-1990 
Full name Project name 2011-2040 2041-2070 2071-2100
C4I_A1B_METO 1,7 3,2 5,0
CNRM-A1B-ARPEGE 1,1 2,2 3,0
DMI-A1B-ECHAM5 0,8 1,7 2,7
DMI-A1B-ARPEGE 0,9 1,9 2,3
DMI-A1B-BCM Reference variant 2 0,6 1,7 2,4
ETHZ-A1B-METO 1,5 2,6 3,4
KNMI-A1B-ECHAM5 Reference 1,0 2,0 3,1
METO-HC_A1B Reference variant 1 1,7 3,0 3,9
MPI-A1B-ECHAM5 1,0 2,2 3,4
SMHI-A1B-BCM 0,7 1,8 2,6
SMHI-A1B-ECHAM5 0,9 2,2 3,4
SMHI-A1B-METO 1,3 2,1 2,8
RCP8,5 DMI-RCP8.5-ECEARTH 1,2 2,3 3,9
MPI-E1-ECEARTH 1,6 2,1 2,4
MPI-E2-ECEARTH 1,2 1,6 2,1
MPI-E4-ECEARTH 2°C 1,4 1,6 2,4
A1B
E1
 
 
Table 41. Precipitation change (%) in all climate simulations, compared to 1961-1990 
Full name Project name 2011-2040 2041-2070 2071-2100
C4I_A1B_METO 5 3 7
CNRM-A1B-ARPEGE 1 -3 -7
DMI-A1B-ECHAM5 3 5 8
DMI-A1B-ARPEGE 0 -4 -10
DMI-A1B-BCM Reference variant 2 3 5 6
ETHZ-A1B-METO 0 -1 0
KNMI-A1B-ECHAM5 Reference -1 0 1
METO-HC_A1B Reference variant 1 1 -2 -2
MPI-A1B-ECHAM5 -1 -1 -1
SMHI-A1B-BCM 2 4 4
SMHI-A1B-ECHAM5 0 2 3
SMHI-A1B-METO 4 6 8
RCP8,5 DMI-RCP8.5-ECEARTH 1 0 -2
MPI-E1-ECEARTH 2 -3 -3
MPI-E2-ECEARTH 8 6 3
MPI-E4-ECEARTH 2°C 0 1 -1
A1B
E1
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Annex II The GEM-E3 Model 
This annex explains the basic features of the GEM-E3 General Equilibrium Model for 
Energy-Economy-Environment interactions. The model has been developed as a 
multinational collaboration project, partly funded by the Commission of the 
European Communities, DG Research, and by national authorities, and further 
developments are continuously under way. Applications of the model have been (or 
are currently being) carried out for several Directorate Generals of the European 
Commission (economic affairs, competition, environment, taxation, research) and 
for national authorities. The most recent one has been the analysis of the 2030 
framework for European climate policies (European Commission, 2014). 
The GEM-E3 Europe model is an applied general equilibrium model, representing 
the European countries, which are also linked through endogenous bilateral trade. 
The model computes simultaneously the competitive market equilibrium for all 
markets (primary inputs, intermediate goods and final goods and services). 
The model has the following general features. Firstly, it is a general model because it 
includes all interrelated markets and represents the system at the appropriate level 
with respect to geography, the sub-system (energy, environment, economy) and the 
dynamic mechanisms of the agents' behaviour. 
Secondly, the model formulates separately the supply or demand behaviour of the 
economic agents, which are supposed to optimise individually their objective 
(maximising welfare for households and profits for firms), while market derived 
prices guarantee global equilibrium. The public sector and the rest of the world are 
exogenous in the European model. 
Thirdly, it considers explicitly the market clearing mechanism and the related price 
formation in the energy, environment and economy markets. Therefore prices are 
computed by the model as a result of supply and demand interactions in the 
markets.  
The model is simultaneously multinational (for the EU) and specific for each 
country; appropriate markets clear European, while country-specific policies and 
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distributional analysis are supported, including the study of the impacts due to 
climate change. 
The model is also multi-sectoral (eighteen sectors in total, with a particular focus on 
energy intensive sectors; Table 42), with structural features of energy/environment 
and policy-oriented instruments (e.g. taxation). The model formulates production 
technologies in an endogenous way allowing for price-driven derivation of all 
intermediate consumption and the services from capital and labour. Regarding the 
demand-side, the model formulates consumer behaviour and distinguishes between 
durable (equipment) and consumable goods and services.  
Table 42. Sectors of the GEM-E3 model 
Agriculture 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Electricity 
Ferrous and non ferrous metals 
Chemical Products 
Other energy intensive 
Electric Goods 
Transport equipment 
Other Equipment Goods 
Consumer Goods Industries 
Construction 
Telecommunication Services 
Transport 
Services of credit and insurances 
Other Market Services 
Non Market Services 
 
The model is dynamic, recursive over time, driven by accumulation of capital and 
equipment. Technology progress is explicitly represented in the production 
function, either exogenous or endogenous, depending on R&D expenditure by 
private and public sector and with the possibility of taking into account spillovers 
effects. 
Regarding trade, the models consider the endogenous trade flows across countries, 
with bilateral trade matrixes by production sectors. 
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The economic, energy, and emissions data of the GEM-E3 model are based on 
EUROSTAT databases (input–output tables, national accounts data, and energy 
balances). Twenty-four EU economies have been modeled individually (the whole 
EU, with the exception of Malta, Cyprus, and Luxemburg62). 
As a benchmark, it was assumed in the JRC PESETA II project that all markets are 
fully flexible, i.e., prices in all markets adjust so that demand equals supply. Such a 
neoclassical paradigm has been used to represent the new equilibrium in the long 
term when all market adjustments have occurred. 
A baseline scenario has been run to 2010 assuming there is not climate change. The 
alternative scenario considers the influence of climate change in the economy, 
climate impact scenario. The reported results compare the values of welfare and 
GDP of the climate impact scenario with those of the baseline scenario. 
 
 
                                                        
62 These three economies are relatively small in size and at the time of the economic runs were made they 
were not integrated in the model. Croatia was not a member state when the runs were made. 
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